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ABSTRACT

Biological Dimension of the Value Theory of the

ANISA Educational Model
S.

(August 1974)

Pattabi Raman, B.Sc. (Hons) Delhi
M.Sc. (Tech) Calcutta
Ph.D. Calcutta

Directed by:

Professor Daniel C. Jordan

The dissertation undertakes two tasks:

(1)

a dis-

cussion of the major issues that must be dealt with in for-

mulating

a

comprehensive value theory for education and

show how the ANISA Model in its present state of develop-

ment is handling those issues;

(2)

establishment of empir-

ical and theoretical referents from the biological sciences
to undergird the deductive formulation of the ANISA value

theory

Perspectives obtained from the current theories pro-

posed by axiologists, social psychologists and cultural

anthropologists point out to one basic concern.

No matter

how comprehensive becomes our understanding of value phenomena and their ramifications in man’s becoming, we still

need

a

set of conceptual guidelines from some other dimen-

sion of human reality which will serve as a general frame
of reference to validate the postulates of the value theory.

Starting from ANISA’

s

definition of value as the pattern of

structuring of the energy accrued as man actualizes his
potentialities, the submission discusses the factors involved

Vlll
in such structuring and makes a case for broadening
the

paradigm of value inquiry by including subjective aim and
ideals which in the ultimate analysis serve as a blue print
for structuring actualized potentialities -- for creating

values
The views obtained on the nature of man and his destiny

from the vantage point of modern theories of biological

evolution, as represented by the works of Julian Huxley,

Waddington and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, clearly indicate
the crucial role of the emergence of consciousness in man’s

future evolution.

These theories of emergent evolution

sound the death knell of both the materialistic and vitalistic
views of the universe thus supporting the Whiteheadian
’organismic’ view of the universe, which forms the philosophical underpinning of the ANISA model.

The evolution of consciousness has given man the pro-

pensity to be aware of the unknowns in his environment and
the capacity for structuring the unknowns by forming of

ideals.

The ideals function as a 'lure' towards future

possibilities and thus become the chief determinant of the
homeorhetic path of becoming and thereby the effective instrument of collective evolution of mankind.

A theory of

value is in essence another facet of the theory of being and

becoming.

By consciously choosing ideals man restructures

his pattern of energy utilization and thereby restructures
own
his values and value systems and takes charge of his

destiny

IX

The subjective aims or the ideals that serve as the
'lure'

for the structuring of the pattern of utilization of

human energy obtain their validation on the basis of

whether or not they facilitate, both in ontogenesis and
phylogenesis, the kind of homeorhesis that places mankind
into chreods leading to greater levels of collective organi-

zation and human solidarity

--

conditions which guarantee

and increase the quality of survival.

X

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION

iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

v

ABSTRACT
CHAPTER

vii
I

INTRODUCTION

1

World Crisis in Education

3

Education and the American Scene

5

Need for New Directions

8

Scope of the ANISA Educational Model

12

Purpose of the Present Study

17

CHAPTER II
EDUCATIONAL THEORY AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE

22

Value Theory and Educational Practice

24

Value Theory and the ANISA Model

27

Status of Literature in Value Inquiry

32

CHAPTER III
VALUE THEORY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
Social Psychologists and Value Theory

Determinants of human behavior

Rokeach's Theory of Value
Beliefs

Attitudes

40
41

41

43
43

XI

Values

45

Value System

45

Cultural Anthropologists and Value
Inquiry

Value Systems and Cultural
Universals

47

48

CHAPTER IV
TOWARD A SCIENCE OF VALUE
Hartman's Axiology

53
53

The fundamental axiom of
value science

55

Extrinsic goodness

56

Intrinsic goodness

57

Implications of Hartman's axiom

58

CHAPTER V
TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE THEORY OF VALUE

60

Perspectives From Current Theories

60

Emergence of Values in the Process
of Man's Becoming

65

Determinants in Structuring of
Actualized Potentiality

69

Validation of Aims and Purposes

71

Nexus between ideals and values
Ideals as working hypothesis
in value theory

Xll

CHAPTER VI
UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS OF BECOMING:
ROLE OF BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES

78

Scope of Evolutionary Biology

79

Mechanisms of the Human Evolutionary
System

85

Socio-Genetic System

86

Huxley’s Humanism

88

Social Homeorhesis

Human Evolution and
the Future

91
a

Vision of
97

The parameter of complexity

98

Thresholds of evolution

100

"Plane tization” of humanity

103

Possibilities for the future

104

CHAPTER VII
BIOLOGICAL DIMENSION TO THE VALUE THEORY
OF THE ANISA MODEL

105

Road Traversed

105

Theories of Evolution and Organismic
Philosophy

108

Consciousness and the "Lure" of the
Future

HO

Quest for ’worthwhile
experiences'

HI

US

ANISA Theory of Value

EPILOQUE

BUILDING A SCIENCE OF EDUCATION:

PROSPECTS

118

Xlll

APPENDIX
A SUMMARY STATEMENT ON THE ANISA MODEL

REFERENCES

BIBLIOGRAPHY

CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION
The most common battle cry of reform movements
in

education throughout history has centered around
the
irrelevance of educational goals and practices to the
needs and exigencies of the day.

Never before has the cry

been so desperate and heart-rending than today,

a

portentous

juncture in human evolution, as man stands poised with

a

feeling of impotent perplexity, at the summit of the "Great
Divide”

--

where he can make

conscious choice either to

a

turn in the right direction and enter

peace and tranquility

--

a

new world of justice,

or he can continue downwards along

the old way of injustice, war and turmoil

--a

course which

leads inescapably to the extirpation of the human race.

About two generations ago,

H.

G.

Wells wrote that man-

kind was engaged in a race between education and catastrophe,
for he was acutely conscious of the cleavages within our

culture, fissures which, as they widen, will in time prove
to be calamitous.

The race was almost lost in the horrors

of Nagasaki and Hiroshima.

In the midst of the nuclear

holocaust unleashed by men, the idea took shape in the
minds of some other men with lofty and far-sighted vision,
to prevent repetition of a similar catastrophe and to work

together for the emergence of
of mankind through education.

a

new and universal fraternity
This was to be achieved by

2

acting on man himself, the cause of the catastrophe, by

appealing to what is most noble in him.

As an embodiment

of an effort to use educational, scientific and cultural

instruments for humanitarian ends on an international scale,
the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural

Organization (Unesco) took shape in 1946 under the auspices
of the United Nations.
a

It was the first attempt to create

public institution in which ideas, rather than individual

or political power, were to be the acknowledged instruments

for achieving the "intellectual and moral solidarity of

mankind."

With

a

clear mandate to revamp education and

educate mankind for

a

world community, with its specialized

agencies and committees, and all the financial and intellectual resources it could muster, Unesco went about its

business with none other than Julian Huxley with his great
intellectual and cultural prestige, energy and humor, as
its first director general.

This unprecedented gigantic

international undertaking in educational planning and
reform caused
ing

a

a

spectacular educational "explosion," creat-

new awareness and ushering in

for education in all countries.

a

highly dynamic decade

Long muted human rights

came to be openly declared and vigorously pursued, including the right to education.

(Hersch,

1969.)

Education be-

came accepted by economic policy-makers not merely as

a

desirable social service but as an essential sector for

3

overall national development.

Unesco declared educational

planning one of its top priorities, developing
its program
by supplying educational planning
experts to
more than

eighty countries and by establishing regional
and international training and research centers.
World Crisis in Education
Despite spectacular educational expansion, there were

many disappointments in educational planning.

A world

survey of problems and prospects in educational planning
reports
There was as it remains today, a great gap
between words and deeds -- between policies proclaimed by ministers attending conferences and the
actions taken in their countries; between methodologies prepared by theoreticians and their application^ the actual planning process. The many
educational planning units often remained understaffed without effective links, -- isolated from
the main stream of educational decision making.
Meanwhile, in the absence of overall integrated
planning, basic educational priorities vacillated
-- jumping from primary education at first to
vocational training, teacher training, secondary
general education, higher education and finally
to adult literacy training.
The inevitable result
was the emergence of wasteful imbalances both within
the educational system and its environment
(Unesco
.

1970, p.

10

.

(emphasis mine)

Recognizing the inadequacies of earlier piecemeal,
short range and unintegrated educational planning, many

countries wrote new prescriptions which, among other things,

demanded that educational planning should have "a comprehensive coverage, embracing all levels and parts of the

4

educational system in

a

single view including qualitative

and quantitative aspects" (Unesco, 1970, p.

11).

if one

seeks dispassionately for reasons why education was not

more successfully planned and implemented to meet the im-

mediate and future needs of the world's peoples, the

explanation may be found in

a

combination of external and

internal constraints of the planning operation.

Soon it

became evident to the planners that:
...without a clear idea of its objectives, an
educational system is as a ship at sea with no
destination; it cannot plan its course and can
end up simply turning circles. A nation's educational objectives, reflecting society's idea of
its own future, must be decided by the society as
a whole and its chosen leaders.
The idea of the
future should embrace basic human values, ethical,
cultural and aesthetic, and also the various roles
the individual will be required to play in society,
as a citizen, worker and member of a family. In
translating these overall goals into educational
objectives those responsible for educational planning can help by insisting that there be reasonable
consistency and an order of priority among various
objectives, since not all of them can be pursued
They must make sure
at full speed simultaneously.
that the definition of objectives and their priority
rating is understood as a continuing process that
should be periodically reviewed (Unesco, 1970, p. 12).

Following the enactment of the International Education
Act of 1966, President Lyndon Johnson called for an inter-

national conference "to stimulate deeper mutual understanding among nations of major educational problems
facing the world."

The proceedings of the conference on

"World Crisis in Education" thus convened in Williamsburg,

Virginia in 1967, provided us with

a

general index of the

5

current thinking on the crisis in education we
face today
and bring to a sharp focus the deep-seated
maladjustments
in most educational systems that are hurling
us to the

vortex of

a

crisis (Bereday, 1969).

Education and the American Scene
While previous pages depict the magnitude of disparity

between expectation and achievement in education in the
international sphere, on the American scene, education is

passing from crisis to disaster in its quest for relevance.
Few undertakings in contemporary American life have provoked
such continuing controversy as education and its institu-

tional operations.

A plethora of articles, countless

speeches, books, and numerous conference reports play endless variations on the same platitudinous theme lamenting
the built- in- inertia of the educational system that in-

sulates it from change and self-renewal.

The tone of this

lament is reflected in the following cogent analysis:
At every level of the education professions the
pressure is felt and the complaints registered.
Jacques Barzun documents how "drudgery, discipline,
and conformity" constitute the basic syndrome of
traditional education. George Leonard condenses
a complex diagnosis into one simple statement:
"The ecstacy has gone out of education." Paul
Goodman, in Compulsory Miseducation describes
education as a system of brainwashing which leads
Carl Rogers views the
to "spiritual destruction."
educational system as a kind of prison where the
person is not free to learn; John Holt describes
the many ways in which the system programs a
guaranteed failure for significant numbers of
Kozol details how education mediates
children.
,
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death at an early age.” Weinstein and those
interested in humanistic education view the
current
s ystem as one which often
punishes an expression
01 feeling and renders the process of
acquiring
knowledge a sterile, mostly irrelevant, and even
destructive experience.
Silberman's efforts at
diagnosis indicate that education is in a period of
serious crises. As a system, it does not address
the development of the whole person; rather it
fragments, compartmentalizes, and precipitates
sel f - al ienat ion
Herbert Kohl points to the
authoritarian atmosphere of the traditional school
and how it snuffs out the life of learning.
Caleb
Gattegno argues that learning is the life of education and in order to sustain that life, teaching
must be ’’subordinated to learning.” Yet, in many
schools learning is subordinate to everything else.
William Glasser, in Schools Without Failure illustrates how education's ill health is directly
correlated with "a philosophy of non- involvement
non- relevance
and a limited emphasis on thinking”
(Jordan and Streets, 1974, p. 1).
.

,

,

Leaders on every level of American society, from the

Presidency to the local Parent-Teacher Association, concur on the desperate need for educational reform.

From the vantage point of the year 2000 if not
earlier, the last decade of education will undoubtedly

appear as the most bizarre in terms of the methods it used

when compared to other human intellectual endeavors.
cation is passing from crisis to crisis because as

discipline it neither begins its endeavors with

Edu-

a

tested

principles, nor is there any plan to test the principles
on which the endeavors are launched.

There is a great

deal of what is called ’experimentation’ going on in

American education, but most of it can

hardly be called

experimentation in the scientific sense since it is not
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conducted with any set of controls.

The fact that something

is simply new does not make
it experimental.

W e are con-

fronted today with a body of beliefs
and attitudes about
education, which, although they are
the determining influence in our educational system, have
not been subjected
to careful analysis.
The American Educational Research
Association identified two significant
characteristics of
the condition of research in education:

disorganization

and lack of orientation to other behavioral
sciences.

It

went on to say
...by disorganization we mean the condition in
which, at present, research too often proceeds
without explicit theoretical framework, in intellectual disarray, to the testing of myriads of
arbitrary, unrationalized hypotheses (American
Educational Research Association, 1953 p. 657 ).
,

Educational research must eventually come to mean more
than an endless testing of hypotheses that are unconnected

and trivial.

objectives and

It must include an inquiry into educational
a

questioning of assumptions underlying

them in an attempt to find

a

unifying frame of reference

from which explicit criteria for determining the relevance
of objectives and their priority.

Compounding the shortcomings in educational research

methodology is the knowledge explosion of this century.
Until recently, the main task of education has been con-

sidered the transmission of the traditions and information

processed by the society to new generations.

In a

8

relatively static situation, this has meant that
the
teacher has but to communicate his own knowledge

and exper-

ience acquired in turn from his own teachers.

In a world

dominated by change, with the reservoir of human knowledge

spectacularly swelling beyond imagination within the life
time of the teacher, nay even within the educational cycle

of the student, and with the growing aspirations of

societies in the light of modern technology, much of the
knowledge, and many of the methods and attitudes of the

past have become obsolete.

Need for New Directions

Without belaboring the obvious any further, it will
suffice to say that there is an imperative need for new
goals, purposes, methods and directions in education on
all levels:
a

local, national, and international.

growing recognition of

a

There is

great need for a distillation

of the thinking of the past half century and for an under-

standing of the direction being taken by education.
chart

a

To

rational course towards its objectives, we need

to know how the educational system originated and what

discernible forces in the past and present are likely to
affect its future.

For such a diagnosis, we must use all

the instruments at our disposal.

Major blind spots in an

educational system will seriously impede plotting
liable future course.

a re-

9

The conclusion seems inescapable that if
education is
to make its proper contribution to the
growth of
the

individual and the society’s development, then
educational
systems everywhere must apply the methods of science
and

undergo sweeping revolutionary changes, as with medicine,

engineering and technology, and other fields of hard
sciences have already done and are still doing.

A dynamic

transformation of the educational system which will enable
it to cultivate adjustment to change and make innovation

fruitful can come only when education adopts the methods
of science, which has opened to modern man worlds of in-

conceivable dimensions

--

submicroscopic to supergalactic.

To apply scientific methods to education requires

articulating

a

comprehensive body of theory which will

address the fundamental problems and issues facing education and which at the same time will serve as
guide to practice.

a

definitive

The effectiveness of the application

can and should then be tested out over periods of time.

Theories enable us to subsume under

a few

principles

a

vast array of what may first appear to be unrelated facts.
Rene Dubos, the well-known microbiologist of the Rocke-

feller Institute, once wrote that after

a

review of all

the important scientific discoveries of the last couple of

centuries

--

such as those of Darwin, Freud, Einstein

--

he found that not one of them was a result of piling up

10

fact on fact.

The discoveries resulted from
the scientist's

perception of the significance of the
relationships and the
meaningful pattern among facts, which
then gave
rise to

the resultant theories.

(May,

Education has yet to find

1967, p. 48.)
a

way of becoming

a scien-

tific enterprise carried on by a self-governing
community
of inquirers who conduct themselves in
accordance with an

unwritten but binding code, bowing to the constraints
of
theory and yet having infinite scope for original and

in-

novative research to refine the theory.

In such an enter-

prise, theory has the role of a self-correcting device or

internal guardianship as

a

basic element.

Unless education

has some such criteria which can be used as a corrective

instrument for the procedures involved, it can never emerge
as

a

science on its own standing.
The need to establish a science of education is con-

firmed by the following statement of a former Associate
U.S. Commissioner of Education:
In principle,

the American educational commitment has always been that every child should be
educated to his full potential, but this commitment has been voiced in terms of resources such
as teachers, books, space, and equipment.
When
a child has failed to learn, school personnel
have assigned him a label -- slow, or unmotivated,
or retarded.
Our schools must assume a revised
commitment that every child shall learn. Such
a commitment must include a willingness to change
a system which does not work and define one which
does, to seek causes of failure in a system and
its personnel instead of focusing solely on
students (Lessinger, 1974).
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The history of American educational practices
during
the past fifty years verifies the repeated
attempts made
to formulate a theory of education.

be lacking was

a

But what seemed to

'science of man' on which to build its

theory, and this science of man was initially sought from

psychology.

Because of the characteristic relation between

psychology and education, psychological theories have
always intrigued educators.

Most educational theories

are spin-offs of major theoretical developments in psych-

ology.

For example, Gestalt psychology, field theory,

psychoanalytic theory, and stimulus-response theory, which
were formulated to explain some aspects of behavior and
learning, were tried out in educational contexts and continue to be explored by educators.

Contributions of James,

Watson, Dewey, Thorndyke, Freud, Piaget and Skinner no doubt

conferred an air of scientific respectability to educational
practice.

The weaknesses of the theories, Schwab observes:

the inevitable in...arise from two sources:
completeness of the subject matters of theories
and the partiality of the view each takes of
Incompleteness
its already incomplete subject.
in
the entirely
seen
of the subject is easily
cognitive theory which takes no account of the
Incomemotional needs and satisfactions....
pleteness of the subject is also visible in
personality theories which reduce the whole
society to an appendage of personality and in
sociological theories which reduce personality
Partiality of view
to an artifact of society.
is exemplified by the Freudian treatment of personality after the analogue of a developing,
differentiating organism, a treatment which makes
it extremely difficult to deal directly with problems
of interpersonal relations (Schwab, 1970, p. 11).
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These weaknesses, characterized by

a

lack of comprehen-

siveness, undoubtedly vitiate the value of
In his

search for

a

a

theory.

relevant educational theory,

McDonald has enumerated the kinds of characteristics any
psychological theory must have to win

a

significant place

as an educational theory and practice:

In the first place,
be impeccable.

its scientific character must

Secondly, since education is a social enterprise,
the theory must be social in character or must
treat social problems in a significant way.
Third, the theory must account for developmental
phenomena
Fourth, the theory must promise some form of control,
i.e., it has systems that lead to procedures with
predictable effects.

Fifth, the theory must somehow evidence its concern
for the individual (McDonald, 1964)
No psychological theory has fulfilled these characteristics
and therefore no comprehensive educational theory has yet

been derived.

"There seems to be no good reason," argues

McDonald, "for educational theory to be committed to any
single theory short of

a

comprehensive science of man."

Scope of the ANISA Educational Model
The realization of a need in the social world has

always been followed by the establishment of institutions

responding to that need.

Goals and ideals will never have

any social effect and will always remain in the realm of

13

hopefulness and utopia unless they are institutionalized
to bring them to the realm of specific
activity.

The

American National Institute of Social Advancement (ANISA)
was designed precisely to attempt

education

a

a

frontal attack to make

scientific enterprise in response to the lack

of any coordinated multidisciplinary team approach to
edu-

cation, its planning and implementation.
It

is

evident that the coherence and efficacy of any

educational program designed to address the total develop-

ment of man, to

a

large extent, lies in the comprehensive-

ness of its theory of the development of man
to be what he should be.

--

how he comes

Phenix succinctly states:

The problem of man and his becoming is particularly
urgent for parents, teachers, school officials and
citizens concerned with the conduct of education.
To choose soundly what to teach and how to teach it,
to judge what educational goals are practicable and
what ones are not -- such wisdom requires the best
possible understanding of human nature and its transformation (Phenix, 1964, p. 3).

Furthermore, Belth writes:
The level of cultural maturity of a society can
be determined by the theory it holds about educaFor any education of its rising generations.
tional theory entails a concept of the relationship between man and the world he must cope with
It contains,
and learn to organize and direct.
too, an interpretation of the effect which one
has upon the potentialities of the other and
Such interexplains how this effect comes about.
pretative concepts suggest the procedures which
should accomplish the goals implicit in a particular theory of education (Belth, 1965, p. 39).

Obviously, in the early stages of the conceptualization of
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the ANISA model, articulating a theory of
development

man’s being and becoming

--

--

of

was the first order of business.

hhere is this knowledge of man and his becoming
to
be obtained?

More than thirty years ago, Alexis Carrel

wrote that Man has been unable to organize himself
because
he did not understand his own nature (Carrel, 1939
).

Unfortunately, there is no single brand of specialists to

whom one can turn for authoritative answers about man as
a

total entity.

As Bahm observes, each science or other

area of specialty discovers something essential to the

nature of man and then tries to reduce the significance of
other essentials to its own.

A chemist may depict the

reality of man as replicating macromolecules.

A physicist

may explain him primarily as a complicated electrical

mechanism.

A biologist may claim him as solely

of evolution.

a

creature

A physiologist may view him entirely as

a

product of his organs, glands, diet, diseases and their
development.

An anthropologist may depict him as only

product of his culture.
him as

a

a

A social psychologist may describe

victim of his social environment.

A linguist may

believe him to be completely molded by his language.

An

artist or musician may see man as primarily an aesthetic
being.

Each of these specialists has

a

make to man’s understanding of himself.
’’But

whenever

a

contribution to
Bahm concludes,

specialist of any kind tries to reduce the

whole of man to any one part of him he makes him somewhat

15

antihumanistic" (Bahm, 1964, p. 349
).
Sorting out this dilemma required

a

broader conceptual

framework which will integrate
purposefully all that is
known about human growth and development.
This broader
framework was to be found in a philosophy
which contains
the most comprehensive view of the
nature
of man.

comprehensive

m

emerge from such

To be

its scope, a theory of development
must
a

philosophical base

--

one which expli-

cates the nature of man, his purpose and
potentialities,
and how he comes to know, feel, and act.

Drawing heavily

on a Whiteheadian expression of the philosophy of
organism,
the ANISA Model views man as a creature at the apex
of

creation whose reality essentially inheres in the process
of his becoming -- translating his unlimited potentialities

into actuality (Jordan and Shepard, 1972).

philosophical base,

a set

From this

of coherent, mutually compatible,

complimentary theories^" of development, curriculum, pedagogy,
administration, and evaluation have been generated (Jordan
and Streets, 1973).

Theory refers to

(See flow chart, p. 16, Fig. 1.)
a

system of propositions and defini-

tions which explain particular phenomena and how they are

1.

Because a fuller explanation of the theories is
beyond the scope of this submission, a summary
statement on the ANISA Model is appended (Appendix)

AN1SA MODEL*

FIG I

Releasing
and Streets, D. T.
Jordan, D. C.
A new
Child:
the
of
the potentialities
care
day
child-rearing,
perspective on
education.
and early childhood
1972
Unpublished manuscript.
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related.

The propositions may be arrived at
inductively

and/or deductively and can be used to generate
specific

hypotheses which can be empirically tested.
system for geometry is such

a

system.

The Euclidean

Furthermore all

theories in the most exact of our natural sciences -such
as quantum theories in physics -- comprise such

There is no

a

a

system.

2

priori reason why similar deductive and in-

ductive procedures should be impossible in the construction
of educational theory.

For the construction of such

a

system to understand man and his becoming, it is necessary
that the system not only fulfilled the logical requirements

of consistency and non-contradiction, but also integrates
the entire phenomena of human experience.

Whitehead provides

a

The cosmology of

conceptual framework for such an inte-

gration which serves to identify and order all the con-

stituent parts of the process of education into

a

single

coherent system.
Purpose of the Present Study

When medicine draws on the accumulated knowledge of
its mother sciences, e.g., biology, and general physiology,

for curing the ills of the human organism, it need not

2.

A fuller discussion of this idea is provided by Werkmeister,
W. H. in "An Epistemological Basis for Quantum Physics,"
Philosophy of Science 17 1950, p. 1-25.
,

,
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hesitate about the goals to be attained or the methods
to
be used.

It has a clear mandate to exploit the distilled

knowledge of the advanced sciences while itself contributing to the development of intermediary disciplines like

pathology, pharmacodynamics, etc.

In contrast, when educa-

tion seeks to apply the advances in psychology, sociology,

anthropology and other disciplines that have to do with man
and his development, it is confronted with

a

tangle of

questions concerning not only ends but also means.

Issues

debated in education can be divided into two broad categories:

those which explore the relevance and relationship

of other human sciences and related disciplines to education

and those which consider questions purely internal to the

process of education, defined more or less in terms of
profession.

a

There is extensive experimentation and innova-

tion going on in American education mostly in the later

category and this, to a great extend, accounts for its

superficiality and inability to strengthen education as

a

dynamic agent for social change.
With the one exception of psychology, the advances
in the mother disciplines of education, viz.,

sociology,

anthropology, philosophy, biology, aesthetics, religion,
receive relatively minimal attention from present-day
educators.
is

twofold.

The reason for this complacency and apathy

The first is the myopic vision of the present-

of
day educators when they come to defining the purpose
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education itself.

Solution of this problem, which con-

stitutes the ultimate test for the educators,

is

of para-

mount importance in the microcosm of education
for it
becomes decisive in the macrocosm of the child's

future.

The second, closely related to the first, is
the academic

aloofness of many educators, rationalized in the name
of

scientific objectivity, in dealing with the problem of
VALUE which pervades and undergirds all other sciences that
study man and his development.

value as

a

These sciences consider

major area of concern and indeed

a

challenge

to the progress and relevance of their respective dis-

ciplines

.

While everyone is ready to affirm the basic importance
of values in education, few educators have really taken
the arduous task of probing into the nature of values,

their origin, their sanction, their growth, and their

relevance to the process of education.

It would be widely

agreed, as Hardie affirms, that the deadlock in formulating

any educational theory that could be translated into educa-

tional practice relevant to modern societal needs, will

center around the nature of value (Hardie, 1961)
an oversimplification, but generally true,

.

It

is

that many edu-

cators feel that socially acceptable values could be

developed by self-discovery and experimentation by the
young, but the degree to which teachers, parents and other

adults should intervene in this process remains in doubt
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for many.

They tend to emphasize the need for informed

and rational judgment in the value-building process without
any clear notion as to what ends the value-building process

should be aimed at.

Because of inattention the study of

values remains, in Brameld's words, "the most neglected

problem in American education" (Brameld, 1966,

p.

151).

The modern distrust of values as something emotional
and illusory and the virtual disappearance of value theory
in current deliberations on education only reflect the

state of chaos and confusion of the field itself in respect
to its

goals and purposes.

No knowledge of lasting inter-

est can thrive in an intellectual climate where values are
at a discount.

Recognition of this vacuum inspired an

attempt to formulate

a

unified theory of value during the

conceptualization of the ANISA COMPREHENSIVE EDUCATIONAL
MODEL.

It soon became apparent that the knowledge needed

for generating a value theory in the ANISA Model should be

sought from a comprehensive knowledge of human growth and

development studied from every possible angle by any

promising method consistent with the philosophical base
of the model and its redefinition of the process of education.

Hence studies had to be aimed at

a

unified treatment

human
of man’s values on different ontological levels of

endeavor and evolution, viz., biological, psychological,
technological, sociological, aesthetic, and philosophical.
values have no
As Whitehead (1933) remarked, "Ideas and

21

existence or real importance until they
are made an integral part of some concrete entity -in this
case until

they are made an integral part of life
and personality of
the growing organism."
The purpose of this study is

a)

to submit for con-

sideration a discussion of the major issues
that must be
dealt with in formulating a comprehensive value
theory and
show how the ANISA Model can in its present state
of

development handle those issues fully and satisfactorily,
and b)

to

establish empirical and theoretical referents

from the biological sciences to undergird the deductive

formulation of the ANISA value theory.

CHAPTER

II

EDUCATIONAL THEORY AND THE PROBLEM
OF VALUE
One of the traditional epistemological
problems which
educators share with philosophers is
that of facts versus
values.
As Cooper (1954) observes, the
problem has always
been "susceptible to confusions of
linguistic and philosophical considerations on the one hand,
with empirical
and scientific considerations on the other."
This is true
especially when practical methods of education
are the

ultimate concern.

The educator has the task of relating

both philosophy and pure science to the applied
science of

education and on this basis construct an educational theory.
One often wonders if there ever will be

a

time when

educators will be free from questions of problems relating to their aims and purposes.

In every age,

educators not

only face new problems unique to their times, but they also
have the obligation to redefine many old problems in the

light of present conditions.

A spokesman for his age,

Aristotle, said,
As things are, there is disagreement about the
things to be taught, whether we look to virtue
of the best life.
Neither is it clear whether
education should be more concerned with intellectual or moral virtue.
The existing practice
is perplexing; no one knows on what principle
we should proceed -- should the useful in life,
or should virtue, or should the higher knowledge
be the aim of our training; all three opinions
have been entertained.
Again about the means
there is no agreement; for different persons,
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starting with different ideas about
the nature
of virtue, naturally disagree
about the practice
Ol 1 1
*

t

«

i

The concerns expressed in the above
statements of

Aristotle as to the aims of education still
continue to
occupy the priority list in the agenda of any
meeting of
the present day educators.

They find themselves ever

increasingly drawn into the labyrinth of conflicting
ideologies.

Contemporary conditions have in fact exacerbated

the problem,

as the following remarks of Childs indicate:

In order to encourage, we must also discourage;
in order to foster we must also hinder; in order
to emphasize the significant, we must identify

the non- significant and finally in order to
select and focus attention on certain subject
matters of life, we have to reject and ignore
other subject matters. Were our values different
our selections and our rejections would also
be different.
The process of selecting and
rejecting, of fostering and hindering, of distinguishing the lovely from the unlovely, and
of discriminating the important from the unimportant is unending in education (Childs,
1950, p. 19-20)
;

It is tempting to become cynical and witty about the

ways the educational institutions cope with the conflicts,

especially when one is

bystander.

a

Obviously, the insti-

tutions are involved with value choices and judgments which
cut to the core of human concerns for many aspects of value

1.

Aristotle’s Politics
Clarendon Press, 1885

Jowett translation.

.

,

p.

245.

Oxford:
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increasingly pervade and undergird the
whole process of
providing and guiding experience in an
educational setting.
Indeed it is difficult to conceive any
sphere of activity
that an educator is involved in that
would not deeply
involve some aspect of value. When we talk
about educa-

tional reforms, we are not just talking about
revamping

education, but are in

a

way debating the kind of society

we desire, the kinds of priorities the society
should be

committed to and the kind of life we wish our future citizens to pursue.

Again, since education is a social enter-

prise and a human pursuit, different ideas about what its

purpose should be arise from different concepts of
a)

man's destiny, b) what must man do in order to prepare

for this destiny? c) what constitutes human nature?

These

are issues which move out of the realm of traditional educa-

tion and concern the very fabric of our civilization.

that sense,

they are universal and timeless.

in educational practice --

Differences

in courses of study,

methods, patterns of support and control

--

In

teaching

are only reflec-

tions of different beliefs about such matters as human

nature, nature of knowledge, and value.
the

These beliefs are

foundations of any educational philosophy

educational theory

--

--

thus an

which guides the course of action.

Value Theory and Educational Practice
To those who are committed to the profession, education
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implies the transmission of both
facts and values that are
worthwhile and not detrimental to
the youngsters.

There is an uneasy feeling on the
part of educators,
especially curriculum specialists, that
while facts are
well taken care of by various sciences,
something called
value” is not. They are preoccupied with
finding a

solution in an academic context with "objectivity,”
i.e.,

through the respectable method of historical,
anthro-

pological, sociological, and logical analysis.

They have

found no satisfactory answers.

Curriculum is much more than

timetable and a descrip-

a

tion of the subject matter to be taught.

It lays down

principle objectives of teaching, the attitudes which should
be developed in pupils toward learning and about life in

general, the skills which education should promote.

The

entire complex of educational objectives and the ways and

techniques by which they are achieved must be involved.

Curriculum planning is an essential part of educational
planning which sets out explicitly the general objectives
of an educational system and the means through which these

objectives are achieved.
One of the greatest weaknesses in curricular practice
is

the failure to treat the problems involved in making

specific judgments of comparative value when we formulate
our objectives.

Clearly, there is

a

need from value

theory constant guidance in making value judgments.
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Rasic problems in the
planning and execution of
major
educations 1 innovations, a
report on curriculum
innovation
says, "is due to the...
need to develop attitudes of
mind
towards making innovations
more acceptable (OCED, 1955
p.

31).
It should be realized that
any such attempt to change

attitudes will have more meaning if
it is
guiding principles that are
systematized

shaped by
to form a philo-

sophical view that delineates purpose,
direction, and goals
This implies the cultivation of right
attitudes of mind in

pupils and teachers so that they may be
receptive to new
developments in knowledge, and free themselves
from an

emotional commitment to error.

Teaching is a distinct goal-directed activity
and
involves

a

general engagement of the teacher's judgment

on experience as it relates to particular goals.

In

teaching, we do not impose our will on the student, but

introduce him to the many mansions of the heritage in

which we ourselves strive to live and to the improvement
of which we are ourselves dedicated.

Throwing

a

child in the river is not itself sufficient

to teach him how to swim.

Teaching normally involves show-

ing him how to do something by action or example and not

merely setting up conditions and environments for interaction under which he may flounder without guidance.

Needless to say, and adequate general theory of value
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must not only clarify many
matters in educational policy
and practice but must
extend and strengthen the
philosophical foundations for an
improved curricular and
pedagogical
theory
Value Theory and the ANISA Model
Since all education is based on
some set of objectives
and since all objectives imply a
prior commitment to a set
of principles as to what is really
worthwhile (valued) in
the ultimate analysis, any discussion
of educational ob-

jectives presupposes prior assumptions about
the nature and
scope of value. This means that the ultimate
criteria for
the validity of our objectives rests on
the viability of

the theory of value.

This will be illustrated as follows.

Using a defini-

tion of education consistent with its etymology 2
as:

The

conscious drawing out of all the potentialities of the

human organism by guiding its interaction with the environment in

a

manner so as to insure the maximum growth and

development of the organism for the ultimate purpose of

2.

One of the most hotly debated issues in education
today is the definition and purpose of education.
Even in this approach of defining education from
its etymology, people have different opinions.
For some the root word is "educe" or "educere"
....to draw out, while for others it is "educare"
....to bring up or rear (Peters, 1966).
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achieving the organism's goal.

In constructing the Model's

educational theory, we had to consider the various questions which arise from such a definition, such as:

What is the nature of the human organism?

How does it differ from other forms of creation?

What is the nature of human potential?
What is the process by which the human potentialities
are actualized?

How does this differ from the processes of the release
of the potentialities of other biological organisms?

How does learning take place?
Is there a difference between learning and growth?

How is knowledge gained?

What are the characteristics of growth and development?

How does this relate to the learning process?
How does one evaluate the process of actualization
of a potential?
What is meant by interaction with the environment?
What is an environment?
Are all environments the same?

How many categories are there?
Can the interaction be guided?

When should guidance be given?

If so, how?

These are certainly some of the basic issues that any

comprehensive educational theory should attempt to clarify.
has subsumed
It is obvious that the ANISA Educational theory

learning, of
under it component theories of development, of
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curriculum, of pedagogy, of
evaluation and of administran,

etc.

(see p.

16)

.

All these theories have
their

metaphysical, ontological, and
axiological underpinnings
derived from the same philosophical
base.

Just as our

understanding of the nature of
knowledge 3 (epistemology)
has had a tremendous impact
on the learning theory and
curriculum practice, pedagogy, and
evaluation, advances in
the other branches of philosophy
will have their impact
on the above theories.
It is evident that the nature
of

our understanding of the science
of value (thereby a theory
of value) will have a significant
effect on the stand taken
in the above-mentioned theories
and consequently on educa-

tion as a whole.
In terms of education,

the understanding, conditions,

and contexts in which values in an individual
arise is of

cardinal importance for it enables us to gain better
control
of the forces operative in the formation of human
person-

ality and in social interaction.

Furthermore, men not

only have values; they also make value judgments and

develop the process of valuing.

3.

The epistemological quest of the Genevan scientist,
Jean Piaget, enabled him to generate a coherent
body of theory of intellectual growth in young
children; and this in turn has caused a revolution,
Copernican in its scope, in developmental cognitive
psychology, in curriculum planning, in pedagogy and
evaluation
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Consequently, any systematic inquiry in
the realm of
value theory should begin by trying to
answer the following
questions

What is

a

value?

What is its origin?

What is the relationship between

a

value and

a

fact?

How many types of values are there?
Is there any

What is

a

hierarchy among them?

value system?

How do values relate to knowing and the learning
process?
Is there any process involved in the formation of
values?

To what extent can a value or a value system be
modified?

Are there any universals in the system of values and
also in the process of value formation?

What is the relationship between values, attitudes
and beliefs and the process of self-actualization
of an individual?
What is the effect of a culture in value formation?
Can we evaluate the process of value formation?

there any ultimate criteria by which we can
validate value judgments?
Is

The above considerations may be the heart of

a

value

theory for education since education is an arena in which
all possible ramifications of the concept of value are

involved.

Ideally, a comprehensive theory of value will

have to include

a set

of propositions which explicate the

phenomenon of value formations and contain clear and
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unambiguous definitions of the
terms involved and explain
the interrelationships that
exist among
them.

Then one can
ask, "What do the answers to
the above questions imply for
the educational process in
general and to curriculum and

pedagogical theory in particular?
The goal for value theory, says
Edel in

a

succinct

statement:
...is to find the unity of value in
the most
systematic, historical, evolutionary picture
of
man from his emergence on the globe to
the present
day, through the various stages of his
with whatever knowledge we have or can development,
acquire of
he appearance of the various value
phenomena and
process of valuation and evaluation, the changes
in
these phenomena, the conditions (biological,
psychological, social and historical) of their appearance
and their change."
.

.

Edel goes on to say that formulation of such a
theory

requires the

basic scope of a Darwin, the sense of internal
dynamics of a Freud, the historical sweep of a
Marx, the unifying penetration of a Bentham, the
logical-linguistic skill of a Carnap. Perhaps
I should add the sensitivity of a Dostoievski
and the moral feeling of a Ghandi, and tie them
all together with the intellectual energy of an
Aristotle.
The conclusion may be that value
theory will be successfully carried out only to
the extent that it becomes the collective effort
of the spirit of philosophy in conjunction with
the body of science" (Edel, 1953).
One has but to survey the literature in social and

behavioral sciences that deal with value to be convinced
of the truth in the above statement.
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Status of Literat.nrp in
Value Inquiry
The literature in this area
is voluminous, and at
the
outset the task of defining
the term "value" itself
is
beset with ambiguity and
vagueness. A bewildering profusion of terms have been
employed for defining the term
"value" ranging from what a
person wants, desires, needs,
enjoys, and prefers through what
he thinks desirable, rewarding, and obligatory to what
the community sanctions or
enforces. A few of the more popular
definitions are

mentioned to demonstrate the great variety
and looseness
of the terms employed (Baier,

1969, p.

33):

aS ° r iS a value
g
and when people behave
-!?
tnwaia it
toward
so as to retain or increase their
possession of it (George Lundberg)

Anything capable of being appreciated (wished for)
is a value (Robert Part and E. W.
Burgess).
Values are the obverse of motives ... the object,
quaiity, or condition that satisfied the motivation
(Richard T. LaPiere)

Values are any object of any need (Howard Becker).
A desideratum or anything desired or chosen by
someone, at sometime -- operationally: what the
respondent says he wants (Stuart C. Dodd).
(A value is) a conception, explicit or implicit,
distinctive of an individual or characteristic
of a group, of the desirable which influences
the selection from available means and ends of
action (Clyde Kluckhohn)
.

’Values' are 'the desirable end states which act
as a guide to human endeavor or the most general

statements of legitimate ends which guide social
action' (Neil J. Smelser)
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For Skinner values have
different connotations and
he writes:
As to value, so far I
can
way of describing what is see a value is simply a
eithei immediately or in
the iong run remforcive
to man"

1961, p.

(Skinner, B.F.,

576)

In no field of human
inquiry is there more semantic

confusion and inconsistency in
terminology as those in the
field of value inquiry.
Such confusion abounds because
there
is a lack of an organized
and scientific attempt to standardize and make clear the terminology
used in the behavioral
and social sciences.
Words which occur in every
language,

while perfectly adequate for the
purposes of every day
living, are not precise enough for making
the subtle distinctions which are required in science and
philosophy.

Precision in thought can be attained only if
the terms
that are used are clear and the meanings of
these terms have

been carefully and precisely defined.

That such precision

in terminology is essential in a science
becomes obvious

the moment one reflects upon the multitude of specific

symbols which have been developed, and which are required
for rigorous and abstract thinking,

like physics and chemistry.

in the exact sciences

In order to communicate system-

atic knowledge and to draw extended inferences, it is vital
that technical terms be used.

For example, the concept
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"H 0" has made possible formal
2
inferences and the discovery
of complex relationships between
substances which simply

could not have been reached through
the use of the common
sense notion of the term "aqua" or "water."
In spite of

diverse interests for a chemist, haematologist,
microbiologist, and food processing technician,
the term
"pH" con-

notes one and only one thing -- "hydrogen ion
concentration." The importance of technical symbols in
the develop-

ment of science has been so critical that the emergence
of

contemporary science and technology to such levels of excellence may in part be attributed to its development of

systematic and precise set of symbols.

a

Certainly, the

freedom of science from superstition and the gradual

emancipation of the applied sciences from subjective biases
leading to erroneous interpretations of phenomena, has
had one necessary condition, the organization of
and systematic set of terms.

a

common

And, as it is frequently

pointed out by contemporary thinkers (Handy, 1964), one
of the major blocks to the present effectiveness of a

science of sociology, or science of psychology, or

a

science of education, is the absence of that kind of

a

"language" as employed in the exact sciences.
Since the matters which philosophy deals with are far

more complicated in their nature than those with which the
exact sciences are concerned, philosophy historically has

35

had much greater difficulty
in freeing itself from
subjective interpretations. And
certainly, until very recently,
little attempt has been made
to develop a common
terminology for philosophic thought.
Some philosophers have tried
to develop a completely new
symbolism for their inquiries,
in which the imprecision and
ambiguity of the field of

philosophical discourse may be eliminated.

Phenix writes

that an organized and pioneer effort
in the direction was
made by Whitehead and Russell in
their celebrated Principia

Ma thematics , which tried to use special
and precise mathematical symbolism for expressing meta-meanings
of philosophy (Phenix, 1964, p. 255).

However, in order to have correct inference
about
things, it is not enough merely to be precise
in the

statement of the definition of terms.

When meaning is

assigned to a term, it must not be given to it in an

arbitrary way.

It is necessary that the meaning be made to

correspond to the characteristics of the object, event,
idea or concept that the term is supposed to represent.

Otherwise, there arises

a

cumbersome technical ’’jargon"

no matter how systematic it may appear to be at first

glance.

Educational literature is particularly notorious

for having developed a pseudo- technical language in recent

years.

Scarcely

a

month goes by without an article appear-

ing which ridicules "educationalists” for their use of a
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jargon that obscures and
confuses rather than illuminates
the real issues.
As Ducasse points out
a systematic
knowledge is obtainable only
to the degree
that the terms

used in thinking are both
precisely defined and defined
with a view to bringing a closer
relationship to reality
(Ducasse, 1941).
Brewster Smith draws our attention
to the conceptual
disarray of the definition of value
in the social sciences
But the increased currency of
explicit
concepts among psychologists and social value
scientists
has unfortunately not been
accompanied by corresconc ®P tua l clarity of consensus.
We"ta?V
e talk about altogether too
many probably different things under one rubric when we stretch
the same terminology to include the
utilities
mathematical decision theory..., fundamental of
assumptions about the nature of the world and
man's
place
it..., ultimate preferences among life
styles..., and core attitudes or sentiments
that
set priorities among one’s preferences and
thus
give structure to a life
And, at the same
time, we are embarrassed with a proliferation
of
concepts akin to values:
attitudes and sentiments, but also interests, preferences, motives,
cathexes valences.
The handful of major attempts
to study values empirically have started from
different preconceptions and have altogether failed
to link together to yield a domain of cumulative
knowledge (Smith, 1969, p. 97).

^

_

m

,

Much of the confusion in value inquiry, writes Kluckhohn:

undoubtedly arises from the fact that one speaker
has the general category in mind, another a
particular limited type of value, still another a
different specific type. We have not discovered
any comprehensive classification of values.
Golightly has distinguished essential and
operational values; C. I. Lewis intrinsic, extrinsic, inherent, and instrumental values.
The
Cornell group speaks of asserted and operating
values.
Perry has discriminated values according
.
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Added to this are the divergent
methods and purposes of
inquiry among the disciplines that
are interested in the
study of values.
Such a state of affairs
by itself

necessitates some compelling theoretical basis
for suggesting a systematic classification of
values.
The breadth and scope of the problem of
value inquiry
is

staggering because the issue of values occupies
an

important position in all the social sciences

--

sociology,

anthropology, psychology, psychiatry, political science,
education, economics, ethics and history.

"Problems of

values," Robin Williams writes, "appear in all fields of
the social sciences and value elements are potentially

important as variables to be analyzed in all major areas
of investigation (Williams, 1968, p. 286).

In each of the

areas, however, the concept of value receives a different

emphasis.

For example, the specialist in ethics is con-

cerned with the meaning of the word "good."

The psychol-

ogist's interest is in the laws of learning as they speak
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to the growth of habits and
behavior of an individual.

The

sociologist and the anthropologist
may study value from the
standpoint of discovering and
analyzing the aims, ideals,
and habits of various religious,
cultural, national and
economic groups. Traditionally, educators
are interested
in fostering aims and ideals and
creating for the future

generation a system of attitudes and values.
The findings and interests of these areas
of inquiry

need to be coordinated and harmonized into

general theory

a

of value for guidance in the decision-making
process in an

educational system.

Educators cannot wisely discharge their

responsibilities if they attempt to deal with major issues
in a piecemeal fashion.

But without any broad frame of

reference there is no alternative.
therefore

a

What is required is

comprehensive value theory.

The problem of axiology (science of values) is to

clarify the criteria or principles by which we determine
what is good in human conduct and action, what is beautiful
in art, and what is right in social action and the institu-

tions which foster them.

The problem of axiology for

education is then to clarify the meaning of value and all
related terms, examine and integrate them as they apply to
the people who are to be served by educational institutions.

The complex nature of value phenomena demands an inter-

disciplinary approach to the formulation of

a

theory of
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value if it is to be comprehensive.

If

it

is

t0 be

efficacious it should not only be
well grounded in psychology, sociology and anthropology,
but must find its roots
in epistemological, ontological
and axiological foundations

of human knowledge.

A theory of value grounded in
but one
area of study concerned with man
is vulnerable; contributions from all are required.

The importance of researching the
contributions of
the many areas of value inquiry in
spite of their varied
interests and methodologies is not denied
but what is

questioned is the adequacy of any one area of inquiry
in
formulating a comprehensive value theory. The following
chapter will be devoted to reviewing some of the
contributions of social scientists which may assume salience
in

formulating the value theory of the ANISA Model.

CHAPTER III
VALUE THEORY AND THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES
The social sciences, Robert
Redfield observes, "occupy
uneasy seats at the feast of
learning between the physical
and biological sciences on
their right and the humanities
on the left
(Redfield, 1962).
The uneasiness, in large
part, is traceable to one of their
primary concerns - values.
While a physicist or a chemist
does not have to worry about
what his "vector" or "DNA" wants,
thinks and believes, it
is impossible for a sociologist
or anthropologist to

investigate any social phenomena without
considering the
nature of the values of a society or
culture.
A psychologist is confronted with the same problem
when he studies
individual personalities. Out of sheer necessity,
the

empirical study of value phenomena has advanced much
further
in the social sciences than in other disciplines.

Culture, society and the individual human personality
are major antecedents of values.

human action to be

a

Parsons has analyzed

system that contains three mutually

irreducible subsystems,

vi_s.

the personality system, the

social system and the cultural system (Parsons, 1951).

Morris recognizes, values play an important role in the
origin, maintenance and nature of these subsystems and

hence in human behavior as

a

whole (Morris, 1964).

Thus

value can be seen as the integrator of the personality,

As
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social and cultural systems, and
therefore, the integrator
of the human action system.

Social Psychologists and Value Theory

Needless to say, the foundations of

a

comprehensive

value theory that will have relevance for
education as an
applied science, should be consistent with
the psychological
theory of human behavior in general and the
findings concerning the dynamics of group interaction in
particular.
is

There

growing recognition today among social scientists
that

an adequate theory of values and morality will
ultimately

rest on the conclusions of developmental social psychology
and psychotherapy.

Determinants of human behavior

.

The starting point

from which many contemporary social and behavioral scientists

begin

a

psychological study of man's growth and development,

individually and collectively as

a

member of

a

society, is

the value attributes of his behavior and experience that

differentiates him from any other creatures.
values are rooted in human behaviors.

For them all

There are many

determinants of human behavior and the viability of theories
advanced in this field depend upon the nature of the set of

assumptions about these determinants and their relationships.

For instance, the classical "Field Theory" of

Lewin in social psychology uses the term "vector" for the
forces which bear upon an individual as he makes

a

decision
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and acts.

To understand value, the
determinants of human
behavior, which are a part of an
individual’s psychic makeup and the environmental milieu
(both social and cultural),
have to be identified and their
influence on the resulting

behavior under

a

given circumstance thoroughly studied.

A determinant of behavior refers
to an influence exerted
upon the person, predisposing him to
act or behave
in a

specified manner in response to
in the field have identified

a

given situation.

Scholars

(or have tentatively agreed

upon) at least three basic determinants
involved; viz.,

belief, attitude (Jacobs and Flink, 1962).
A study that provides a simple and clear
understanding of the nexus between value and the above mentioned

basic determinants of human behavior is that of Milton
Rokeach (Rokeach, 1968, 1973).

Rokeach’s identification

and definitions of the determinants of behavior and their

interrelationships are not only congruent with those of
Brewster Smith (1963) and Robin Williams (1968) but are
also parallel to the general framework for a unified social

theory outlined in the classical treatise of Parsons and
Shils (1951) and the monumental decade-long work of

Kluckhohn and his collaborators (1961)

,

thus bringing a

cross disciplinary validation of some significance to

Rokeach’s work.
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Rokeach'

s

Theory of Value

While empirically oriented,
social psychologists over
the past few decades have
been paying more attention
to the
theoretical aspects of attitude
and attitude measurements.
Rokeach, realizing the ripeness
of the
time to shift social

psychology's concern, put foreward

a

theory of value which

brings about some conceptual
clarity in our understanding
of values and attitudes and
their functional interconnections.
His work also includes substantial
empirical investigations to show that enduring changes
in important attitude and value systems are possible
as a result of certain
educational procedures, other than persuasion
or indoctrination (Rokeach, 1971).
He identifies three basic determinants
in human

behavior:

viz., beliefs, attitudes, and value; and his

theory throws some light on how values are formed.
Bel ie f s

.

Every conscious human being has

a

certain

basic way of perceiving things for himself, i.e., to
make some sense out of the physical and social world in
terms of its structure and operation.

These perceptions

and personal inferences (which may be true or false,

objective or subjective, conscious or unconscious) constitute the basis of

a

belief.

Every person has thousands

of beliefs about the world around him, and these beliefs
are among the basic determinants of behavior.

A belief
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system represents the total
universe of a person's beliefs
about the physical world,
social world and the self
(Rokeach, 1960).

—

itUd6S

Per sonal beliefs are often
very transient.
As an individual grows, they
become modified; but at any
one time, a relatively stable
cluster of beliefs
:

or an

enduring organization of beliefs are
formed around an object, event, or an idea which
predisposes the individual to
behave in some manner. Like nucleotides 1
in a biological
system, the beliefs become organized into
a well-defined

pattern or a system having definite observable
behavioral
consequences.

These relatively enduring clusters of

beliefs are called ATTITUDES and become hierarchically
im-

portant behavioral determinants

--

important because they

are stabler than the basic determinant belief or
belief

system.

According to Rokeach, attitudes, which can be

learned, have definite cognitive and affective components

which reinforce each other.
evaluative component.

Besides they also have an

An attitude is an integrated belief

system but not all beliefs are differentiated aspects of
an attitude.

1.

For instance, when an attitude is formed

Nucleotides are the basic biochemical building blocks
of the nucleic acid molecule, like RNA and DNA of the
biological system.
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about an entity, not all the
beliefs about that entity take
part in forming the relatively
durable structure.
For
Rokeach, since an attitude has an
evaluative component,
it leads to a preferential
response or behavior. A person,
he says, "is predisposed selectively
to perceive, recognize
judge, interpret, feel, learn, recall,
or think in ways
congruent with his attitude" (Rokeach,
1968, p. 122).
Or,
in other words,

Values:

attitudes mediate purposive behavior

.

Clusters of integrated attitudes form values;

they are the main determinants of behavior in any
situation

Values elicit two types of results; preferable types
of

behavior and preferable types of terminal goals.

When we

say that a person has a "value," it is to say that he has
a

pattern of relatively enduring clusters of beliefs

(attitudes) which says to him that a particular type of

behavior or

a

particular goal is preferable to alternative

ways and goals.

Value for Rokeach is

a

more dynamic con-

cept which has strong volitional components as well as

affective and cognitive components.
Boiling all these down to

a

succinct theoretical state

ment, Rokeach writes, "values are guides and determinants
of social attitudes and ideologies on the one hand and of

social behavior on the other (Rokeach, 1973, p. 24).

Value System

:

Once a value has been internalized,

it becomes a conscious or unconscious criterion for guiding

action and for evaluating the actions of one's own self or
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the actions of others.

Rokeach observes

(

1968

,

p.

160 )

that this definition of
belief, attitude, value -the
trinity of human behavioral
determinants is completely compatible with the one advanced
by others like Kluckhohn,
Smith and Williams. The
distinction made between preferable
modes of behavior and final goals
of actions classifies

values as instrumental and terminal
respectively.
A person’s value system is defined
as a learned or
acquired organization of rules (basic
values) for making
choices and for resolving conflicts
between modes of behavior and goals of actions. People are
often confronted
with a problem or conflict situation which
they cannot
resolve because they cannot behave in a manner
congruent
with all their values. One value may be pitted
against
another.

They may have to decide whether the mode of

behavior or the goal of their actions

is

preferable and

this depends upon the contending rules of the hierarchy

forming the clusters of their values that make up their
value system.

A person's total hierarchy of values is,

then, called a value system.

A person's total value system

may contain thousands of beliefs, hundreds of attitudes,
few dozen values.

a

It follows from this that any change in

one part of the system, if prolonged, will change the parts

connected to it thus leading to
goal shift.

a

behavioral change or

Attitudes and values, whether instrumental

or terminal, are always cognitively and affectively

a
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interrelated.

When the value system is internally
consistent, it will be the chief determinant
of a person’s
behavior and goal in life. The total personality
of a

person thus depends upon how his value system
is consistent
and close to reality.
The theory has ramifications
for

incorporation into the comprehensive value theory of
the
ANISA Model, which will be discussed in a later section.
Cultural Anthropologists and Value Inquiry

Values pervade the culture of every society in the
sense that the conduct of any individual in the culture
is always

subject to the value system of society.

Any

attempt to define behavior and education without reference
to

cultural contexts becomes meaningless.

Every society

strives to make its newborn behave according to the society’s

"norms.”

The process of encul turation (transmission of

knowledge, values, beliefs, attitudes, habits, laws and
customs acquired by man as

a

member of that society)

is

supported by specialized agencies and institutions of
the society;

the school is probably one of the most influ-

ential agencies outside the home and family.
the ages,

Throughout

the first and foremost task of education has been

that of transmitting, expanding and in some cases refining
the great values in each culture.

Occasionally every cul-

ture becomes conscious of itself and questions critically
its own weaknesses and strengths.

In a given culture there
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may be many schools of thought
each based on a different
perspective on the process of
"enculturation." These perspectives have one distinguishing
common feature; they
agree that "culture is the fulcrum
of an effort to interpret the meaning of man, his existence
and his actions”
(Brameld, 1971).

But since each culture has its own
value
system, the outcome of the effort will
be different in each
case

Value Systems and Cultural Universals

The contribu-

.

tions of cultural anthropologists may
be of great rele-

vance to value theory for anthropologists have
always been
interested in questions concerning values:
Can any value

system be considered as universal, if not basically
absolute?
Are all values inherently relative and is it futile to

search for pan-human relations and values?

Have we any

reason to assume that the values that have emerged out of
any given culture have any objectivity superior to those

which have emerged from another?

Is

there any possibility

of transcending the ethnocentric predicament in the making
of value judgments?

evaluation?

Can there be culture-free cues and

(Kluckhohn, 1953.)

Anthropologists, according to Linton, have consistently avoided judgments regarding what things are universally desired or valued in the final analysis.

Their

principal contribution to date has been the development of
the concept of cultural relativity.

Through cross-cultural
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studies, they have been able
to demonstrate that
different
societies have successfully
achieved the same ends by
employing different means, and
all of them prize and
desire
certain values and are willing
to work together to achieve
them.
"In broad general terms," says
Linton, "a value can
be defined as something that has
the capacity to influence
an individual’s decisions in
choice situations or going
one step further back, anything
capable of producing an
emotional response" (Linton, 1954).
Under this there are,
of course, individual values as well
as those which are

cultural, i.e., shared and transmitted by
the members of

particular society.

a

However, in a search for universals,

the individual values may be ignored.

They are transitory

like the persons who have them and may have
influence on
the socio- cultural continuum only when they come
to be

shared by other individuals.

In all cultures there are

events, objects, and concepts toward which members of the

society have strong attitudes.

In certain cases, members

of a society will work as hard to avoid certain things as

they will to win other things.

Generally, in anthropolog-

ical studies, the single term "value" is substituted for

more precise term, "value- attitude system."

definition of this term

a

a

Within the

value may be regarded as anything

toward which the members of a society normally have

a

definite attitude, whether favorable or unfavorable.
Values are an integral part of any society’s culture
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and with regard to their
historical origin, transmission
and integration, they follow
the same rules as any
other
element of culture. A normal
society consists of a wellorganized, self-perpetuating group
of individuals which
persists far beyond the life-span of
any one of its com-

ponent members.
presence of

a

Its persistence is made possible
by the

culture, i.e., an organized body of
ideas

and behavior patterns which are
transmitted from generation
to

generation within the society by learning.

The culture

as a whole provides techniques by
which the members of

the society can both satisfy their individual
needs while

cooperating toward the achievement of common ends.
All societies and cultures are constantly in
of flux and internal readjustment.

a

state

Individuals develop

new solutions to old problems, new patterns of thought and
behavior emerge as

a

result of progressive leaps into novel

and creative ways of dealing with the changing environment.

These changes may produce disharmonies in the culture

which will create tensions and pressures on the individual
who must find new ways to adjust.

In this situation of

constant flux, the society’s main guide in facing new
situations and in deciding which of the new patterns of
thought and behavior should be accepted and integrated into
the 'culture is the society’s system of values

.

At the same

time it is this system that also guides the member's course
of action in any new situation amongst possible alternatives
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v.hich are always

presented at

a

given time.

In both cul-

tures and individuals, there is
always some divergence

between personal values and value systems
of the culture;
the degree of divergence may usually
be

taken as an index

of a person's psychological or social
stability.

Cultural and social anthropology is to the
community,
what psychology is to the individual.
Anthropologists

are

concerned with the dispassionate analysis and
observation
aimed at discovering the deeply rooted subconscious
motives
that determine collective behavior patterns of
integrated

societies.

Psychologists find that there is

a

universal

need for social dependency in which the interactive person
finds the meaning for his life in his relations with others.

Just as the psychologically dependent infant would die, the

socially dependent adult falls into apathy which may lead
into psychological death.

Eric Fromm, coming from another

discipline, has put it,
Unless the person feels that he belongs somewhere, unless his life has some meaning and
direction, he would feel like a particle of dust
and be overcome by his individual insignificance.
He would not be able to relate himself to any
system which would have meaning and direction
to his life, he would be filled with doubt and
his doubt eventually would paralyze his ability
to act or to live (Fromm, 1941, p. 21-22).
It may be a fitting conclusion to end this section with
a

relevant observation by Kluckhohn:

d
and urest generalizations
that L^hronn?
f
anthropology can make
about human
that no society is healthy or creative beings is
or strongg
* he society has a set of
common values
hich give it meaning and purpose to
which can be symbolically expressed, group life
which fit with
the situation of the time as well as
being linked to
the historic past which does not
outrage men’s
reason and which at the same time appeals
to their
emotions (Kluckhohn, 1952a, p. 112).

CHAPTER

IV

TOWARD A SCIENCE OF VALUE

Philosophers throughout the
ages have attempted to
discover a common core in
value phenomena by deriving
values
from the essential structure
of being.
This ontological
approach to formulate a science
of value with the purpose
of generating a unified
concept of value based
on a

generic sense of the term is often
referred to as 'axiology .'

Hartman

*

s

1

Axiology

Robert Hartman's contributions in
the realm of value
inquiry and value judgments take us
in an entirely different direction. The "Science of
Value" elaborated by him
may provide the key to future realms of
knowledge needed to
tackle many controversial issues in the
study of
values.

Robert Hartman's axiology as Weisskopf contends
"comes very
near to the derivation of values from the
essence of things"
(1959, p.

217).

Rather than attempting to fully expound

his decade-long contribution to axiology,

I

shall briefly

enumerate the key concepts of his axiology that are the

prerequisites for an in-depth understanding of his system,
the educational implications of which have yet to be explored.

1.

Nicholai Hartman (1932) of the Austro-German school,
Wilbur Urban (1941) of the United States and George
Moore (1903) of England can be regarded as the founding
fathers of modern axiology.
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Hartman's contributions lie
in his attempt to build
the foundation of a systematic
theory of value and in
leading his readers to some
orderly thinking about the
realm of value.
For him, axiology is to ethics,
aesthetics,
economics, sociology, anthropology,
education and politics,
what mathematics is to chemistry,
physics, biology and
other natural and applied sciences.
Axiology
is a frame-

work for explicating the value
phenomenon.
it has its own axioms,

Like mathematics,

definitions, rules of reduction; its

own dimensions, parameters, and
scale of measurements.
In all his publications, Hartman shows
a close

parallel between mathematics and his axiology,
even as to
their recent origins. Just as Newton's Principia
Mathematica
was the beginning and basis for all modern
sciences, in the

estimation of Hartman, Moore's Principia Ethica may be the
mother book" of axiology.
man's thesis lies in having
idea of "Good."

The crux in understanding Harta

very clear notion of Moore's

To give a brief historical perspective,

Hartman's starting point was the logical analysis of the
following sentence from Moore's book:

"Good is good and

that's the end of the matter" (Moore, 1903).

It seems that

Moore could not define his own term and he evaded defining
it

in his book,

just as physicists found it impossible to

measure the vector of

a

sub-atomic particle but still went

on building theories of atomic and particle physics.

It
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not until 40 years later
that Moore formulated
the two
following propositions,
elaborating on his previous
worh.

'.-as

1-

iS

3

anything?"
2.

n3tUral P ro P ert T of

though^ this is so it depends
entireiv 2
the natural properties' of
that which has^it?" 3
•

•

But again, Moore could not
spell out in which way "it

defends." Hartman's "formal axiology"
begins from this state
of Moore's bewilderment and
"sets in and defines exactly
the nature of this depending " (Hartman
1959).

T he fundamental axiom of value
science

.

Hartman's

clarification of the meaning of Moore's
two propositions
was the critical step in developing
his axiology.
He

reformulated them in the following way, thus
throwing light
on the nature of the " depending M
.

(a)

Goodness is a property not of objects basically
but of concepts

’

.

(b)

An object's goodness depends upon whether it is
w hat or as_ it is supposed to be.

Equating

goodness" with "value" in the above propo-

sitions, one obtains what is called the "fundamental axiom"

2.

Emphasis mine.

3.

"It" meaning goodness.
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in Hartman's axiology, or
his definition of the idea
of

value
At this stage an example is
needed to explain this
axiom from which flows theorems
and corrolaries of Hartman's
axiology.
Let us examine the following
propositions.
A.

The University of Massachusetts is
good if it
is what it is supposed to
be.

B.

The University of Massachusetts is
good if it
1S as 1 b is supposed to be.

E xtrinsic

goodness

.

The statement "A" describes func-

tionally the attributes of UMass., i.e., it is
good because
it has

functionally all the attributes of

an educational

university

institution which is providing facilities

for promoting education.

Or,

in other words,

attributes or concepts of the class
it belongs.

a

--

it has all the

university, to which

This goodness by virtue of its belonging to

a

class and fulfilling all the attributes of the class is

extensional goodness, also called EXTRINSIC GOODNESS, inasmuch
as

it refers

to a relation between the qualities of UMass.

and the qualifications of a university.
that the relation between a member of

a

It is evident

class and the class

to which it belongs is the commonness of their attributes.

By putting "what it is supposed to be" in statement "A" we

are actually asking to what class UMass.

is

supposed to

belong, given the attributes.
UMass. becomes a good university if it has all the
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attributes of universities

It follows,

.

then, that "anything

good or valuable if it has all
the attributes or concepts
of the class it belongs to
or in other words, a thing is
good when it fulfills the definition
of its concept.
This
is

goodness as we see is not ethical goodness
but axiological
goodness, as Hartman puts it
Intrinsic goodness.
B

When we come to the statement

which is that "UMass. is good if it is as it

is

supposed

to be," the goodness here refers not with
respect to having

all the attributes of a class but as UMass.

itself is

supposed to be, i.e., its goodness depends upon, not only
its membership in the Class of University, but on itself
--

on its being as it was intended to be in the first place

when it was established.

The intention refers to its own

particular criteria for being

a

good university, e.g., its

aims and the quality of education it desired to provide.

This kind of goodness is called intentional goodness or

INTRINSIC GOODNESS.

This goodness has uniqueness because

no other university can be exactly like UMass. under this

condition.

Thus, Hartman defines two kinds of goodness or

values in his axiology.
While elaborating on the importance of this axiom
of axiology, he once again shows the parallel between

axiology and mathematics.

The key to understanding the

science of value lies in the recognition of the fact that
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the value of anything
applies only to concepts
or attributes
of the objects and not
to the objects themselves
(Hartman,
1967)
Im plications of Hartman's

»in.

There are a number
of important implications
issuing from Hartman's axiom:
1.
The axiom itself throws light
on a multitude of problems
which have plagued value theory
for 2,000 years, such as:
(a)
the relationship between fact
and value;
(b)

the absoluteness or relativity
of value;

(c)

the objectivity and subjectivity
of value;

(d)

the nature of goodness and badness
of the

world (Hartman, 1959).
The axiom deals with dimensions of
value which have a
certain hierarchy. Any entity can be valued
in three di2.

mensions called systemic value, extrinsic
value and intrinsic
value according to the degree it fulfills the
definition of
its concept and depending upon the frame of
reference; e.g.,

we love mankind systemically

sically

,

,

our next door neighbor extrin-

and our life partners intrinsically.

Usually,

values grow from systemic to extrinsic to intrinsic.
3.

The relationship between the actual and the ideal in

any entity is also explained by the axiom.
is applied to an individual,

A person is systemically good

being

a

When the axiom

it explains his structure.

(or valuable)

because of his

part of mankind, his species, and having all the
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attributes and contributing to the
collective life of mankind.
He is extrins ically good when he
fulfills

the expec-

tations as

a

member of

a

particular class

administrator, doctor or farmer.
good as

a

--

a

teacher,

A person is intrinsically

doctor when he is as good as his conscience
as

doctor demands.

Or,

in other words,

a

a

person is good if

he follows his conscience to become what he
himself has set
to become,

i.e., when he attempts to fulfill his subjective

aim or purpose in life.

value

Thus conscience is an intrinsic

4

One of the educational implications of Hartman's pro-

positions is that

a

"sense of values" depends on knowing

the attributes that define a particular class and on knowing

how something is "supposed to be"

--

i.e.,

standards of

excellence and quality, etc.

4.

This raises another point. According to Hartman's
value theory, a master thief is a good thief if he
In terms of his
steals well and is a perfectionist.
own aim, though it may be detrimental to the collective
security of the population around him, the thief is
"good" axiologically.

CHAPTER

V

TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE THEORY OF VALUE
From the point of view of educational
practice, the
present status of value theory is analogous
to that

of the

theory of knowledge or learning at the beginning
of this
century.
Each discipline has made its own contribution

without any preconceived plan or pattern of inquiry as
to
which aspect of value it should investigate, and yet these
studies show the many important dimensions of value.

To

demonstrate how they all seem to fall into place will be
the task of a comprehensive value theory.

Perspectives From Current Theories
There is a relative ubiquity of the value-attitude concept across disciplines.

Attitudes seem to be the special

concern of psychologists and sociologists while values and

value systems have long been a central attraction to social
or cultural anthropologists.

These disciplines share

a

common concern with the antecedents and consequences of
value organization.

None of the theories discussed here

touches directly on the relevance or application to educational theory or practice though they are implied in each
of them.

Sociology was defined by Max Weber as "that science

which aims at the interpretive understanding of social

behavior in order to gain an explanation of its causes,
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its source and its effects"

(Weber, 1962).

Identifying

value as the chief determinant of
social behavior of an
individual
actual life situations, the social
psychologist, Milton Rokeach, provides a
reasonably clear notion
of his model -- a person-centered
theory, outlining

m

the

mechanisms involved in the formation of values
and organization of an individual’s value system. Values
determine

behavior and Rokeach (1973, p. 211, 338) holds that
value
change leads to attitudinal and behavior modification.
Values are implicated as dependent or independent variables
at virtually all levels of social function -- cultural,

institutional, group and individual.

Since the life process

depends on the selection or rejection of certain aspects
of the environment, the preferential behavior

--

the positive

or negative orientation toward an object, idea or event
is

basic phenomenon of life.

a

--

For Rokeach, true to the

tradition of a social psychologist, the study of preferential behavior constitutes the science of value.
This view may lead one to infer that Rokeach’

theoretical persuasion is not far removed from that of
B.

F.

Skinner who views values in a different light when

compared to social psychologists.

1.

1

For Rokeach value is a

In Beyond Freedom and Dignity Skinner argues "that the
reinforcing effects of things are the province of
behavioral science, which, to the extent it is concerned with operant reinforcement, is a science of
Skinner concedes
values" (Skinner 1971, p. 104).
value to be at the most a by-product.
,

,
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more dynamic concept and has a strong
motivational component
as well as cognitive, affective
behavioral components.

Values that are internalized as a result of
cultural, societal
and personal experience are more or less
psychological
structures that in turn have consequences of their
own.
Values, as Rokeach rightly comments, serve
ing function"

(Rokeach, 1973, p. 25).

a

"self-actualiz-

They also represent

what has been actualized.
A value theory like that of Rokeach (which considers

values as determinants of behavior and explains the change
and the mode of change of behavioral determinants) has yet
to account for the much needed vital relationship between

its position on development of the person’s "value system"

and the "value system" of the theory of cultural dynamics
as it is emerging from contemporary anthropological research.

Anthropologists have shown the importance of
system for a culture or

a

a

value

society’s stability and viability.

But all cultures do not appear equally stable and therefore
to hold that values, value systems,

and value judgments of

all societies are equally valid and relative to the society
in which such judgments are made is a rather naive and weak

theoretical position.

The proof of this lies in the fact

that in important matters, men do not act on this theory.

They always look for an objective basis for value.
the concept of cultural relativism

While

frees the mind of the

observer from errors of ethnocentric biases, it makes, as
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Fried observes, exceptionally
difficult, perhaps even impossible, the task of scientifically
analyzing and comparing cultures and their values
systems (Fried,
1964, p.

i

64 )

.

Value systems and value judgments,
as Benedict concludes, are expressions of the
total pattern of culture
(Benedict, 1934).

Members of different societies start
from

different premises for validating their
judgments, and
therefore, there is no basis for argument
that does

not beg

the question.

It is

in this area,

anthropologists find,

that disagreement seems most frequent and
often irremedial
(Wellman, 1963)

.

Since there are no universally accepted

premises, no universal validity is possible.

which holds that all values are relative is
one,

in fact,

even a permissive one.

A theory
a

protective

It only justifies

our resistance to aggressive people who insist on their
own

value scheme as final.

But it does not enable us to com-

bine forces and rally men to take

a

firm stand against

injustice, cruelty, exploitation, prejudice, or any other

undesirable state of affairs.

This position was probably

tenable when societies and cultures were isolated and

ethical standards of one culture in no way affected detri-

mentally the way of life of the other cultures.

This is

untenable in this era where ecologists have realized the

wisdom in the old Vedic 2 saying "Even the dropping of

a

dry leaf from a tree has its own effect on the universe.'*

2.

Vedas are the sacred scriptures of the Hindus.
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As Hocking remarks

(probably dogmatically):

f
stran ge shallowness of recent
?
n life that
it should be deemed a conceit
to
recogn'ze an absolute, and a humility
to cSnside^
11 standards relative, where as
it is precisely
he reverse:
it is only the absolute that
duly
7
rebukes our pride (Hocking, 1959,
p. 166).

No sound axiological theory can
develop on the basis

of current assumptions of anthropology
and sociology in
respect of the relativism of values in different
societies
and cultures, unless there is a sound basis
for validating
the value system at another level of human
reality.

Hartman has given us

a logical

(axiological) definition

of value and a reasonable concept of conscience,
but his

system needs an exogenous reference system on the basis
of which his term "as it is supposed to be" can be given
true meaning.

No doubt his system appreciates the need for

realizing the expositional properties or purpose of an
entity

(a

concept not so popular until recently in the world

of behavioral scientists)

,

but again one can go on endlessly

disputing what "as it is supposed to be" is.
Hartman's attempt "stumbles on the lack of

a

In this regard

theoretical

stance" from which one can select the relevant sets of

properties intrinsic to the entity (Welty, 1970)

.

As

explained earlier, according to Hartman's value theory,

master thief

a

is a good thief for he steals well and is a

perfectionist in his technique.

In terms of his own aim,

though it may be detrimental to the collective security of
the society around him,

the thief is "good" axiologically.
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To brand this robber as a
moral degenerate, one would
need
an external standard as a
reference point which will

articulate the individual's true
purpose and goal in life.
It is natural that any axiological
judgment would differ
from person to person because of
one's ignorance or non-

acceptance of the purpose of an entity (or
the expositional
properties of the thing) under consideration.

This serious

deficiency of Hartman's axiology is alluded
to by Robert
Mueller in his criticism of Hartman:

Hartman s system is neat, clean and mathematically
and logically unassailable as long as it remains
in its tower.
But the consequences of its descent
into the real world are disas terous
But this
is not to say that Hartman's work could not
be used
in conjunction with other systems to form some
sort
of value study or test.
In particular, since the
test depends for its validity on the system's ability
to determine value in things themselves (expositional
properties of things)
and since in the present system,
this ability is lacking, some other criterion would
have to be invoked; but once invoked, there is no
apparent reason why a real system and test might not
develop (Mueller, 1969).
'

.

.

.

.

Emergence of Values in the Process of Man's Becoming
The ANISA theory of development which explains the

nature of man's becoming as the processes of actualizing his
innate potential, identifies five basic categories of psych-

ological potentialities.

When these potentialities 4 are

3.

Parenthetical phrase is mine.

4.

Potentiality comes from
"latent power."

a

Latin word and connotes
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actualized through the interaction
with the environment,
they become power or energy
("ef fectance"
to use Robert

White's term [1959]) to the
becoming man which enables
him
to interact further to
increase his
ef fectance.

Like all

orms of energy, which are
available only in quanta, the

actualized potentialities form enduring
quanta, or aggregates, or structures which
predisposes the interacting
organism to respond in a specified way
to some aspect of
an environment.
The actualized potentialities are
not random expressions
of energy utilization.

The expressions are patterned; these

patterns, when they are relatively enduring,
are called value
in the ANISA theory.
Presumably these patterns are
the

result of (functioning) structures which are
formulated (in
the brain)

ment.

as a consequence of interaction with the
environ-

The formulation of these structures is what is meant

by the term learning; learning competence means developing

structures which enable one to understand what to do to

establish other structures that are wanted as efficiently
as possible.

Thus learning competence is the fundamental

expression of transcendence.

Actualization of potentialities does not take place
in a

vacuum and interaction with all aspects of the environ-

ment -- micro to the macrocosmic
in the process.

--

are inextricably involved

Thus value formation is the structuring of

potentialities from all categories, viz., psycho-motor,
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perceptual, cognitive, affective
and volitional, fused with
information about the environment.
Since

the fusion includes

volitional elements, values always
have an evaluative or
decision-making constituent which has
implications for
increasing effectance. Thus the
emergence of values is the
process of becoming. Values predispose
the organism to
respond or behave in a certain way in
relationship
to some

aspect of the environment usually in
terms of

a

purpose,

and as Rokeach observes, guides human
action and is a deter-

minant in behavior.

Values are indispensable outcomes of

the process of becoming; they are reflected
in all thoughts,

relations and activities no matter what man thinks
or

believes or how he responds to his fellow men, society,
himself and the cosmos.

They are either subjective, laden with

feelings, or objective and rational.

They are embodied

in all man's interpersonal relations,

goals, and behavior.

A value system is composed of all the values usually inte-

grated around aims, purposes or ultimate concerns.
The patterns in the use of the energy available to the

organism as

a

result of structuring of the 'actualized

potential' and the ends to which the energy is used by an

individual defines the self and constitutes the structure
of personality or identity (Kalinowski and Jordan, 1973).
A considerable number of clinical findings which reveal
the principles of normalcy, growth and maturation of psycho-

logically healthy individuals and evolution of their value
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structures have been gathered and
coordinated by several
psychologists such as Maslow (1962) and
Fromm (1955).
Shoeben gives the following criteria
for normalcy:
"Selfcontrol, personal responsibility,
social responsibility,
democratic social interest and ideals"
(Shoeben, 1957).

Concepts of "adjustment," "integration,"
"mental health or
happiness" and "self-actualization" in clinical
psychology
can become relevant only in a unified frame
of reference

pertinent to patterns of structuring of energy and
its use
as articulated by ANISA's value theory.
Maslow has made
this abundantly clear by stating that the right sort
of

psychotherapy is relevant to the search for values.

He

observes
I
think it is possible that we may soon even
define therapy as a search for values, because
ultimately the search for identity is, in
essence, the search for one's own intrinsic
values (Maslow, 1962, p. 166).

Problems of personality maladjustment, growth and development cannot be adequately interpreted except in terms of
a

coherent and orderly use of the energy as the actualized

potential of man is structured.
The identity of man -- the patterns of his use of the

quanta of energy

--

depends to

a

large extent upon the

society in which he has been brought up.

structured 'actualized potential'

--

How values --

differ according to

the cultural and social milieu of the growing human being

can be easily visualized when one ponders the effect of
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encul turation seen in such diverse types as
the English

aristocrat, the Australian Bushman, the Hollywood
'model,*
and the Indian Yogi, all of which leaves one
wondering if
there is anything basic or universal underlying
the formation of values.

Personality is primarily

a social

product

and since societies are in a state of flux, there is a

continual reconfiguration in the value system (i.e., re-

structuring of the actualized potential) from early childhood to old age, depending on the quality of the interaction between the individual and the environment.
is, moreover,

a

reciprocal relationship,

mutual reinforcement between the two

--

a

There

relation of

the personality of

the individual and the structure of the social environment.

No arbitrary change in the individual's value system will

suddenly alter the personalities in the social system as

a

whole in a desired direction.

Determinants in Structuring of Actualized Potentiality
There are many factors that guide or influence the
dynamics of structuring of the use of energy as human poten-

tialities are actualized.

It

would be the role of

a

compre-

hensive value theory to identify and speculate on the nature
of the forces which will either be confirmed or disproved

on the basis of further empirical evidence.

While it would

be virtually impossible to study these factors in any

absolute way, one important factor which has been empirically
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validated is the nature of the
information about the environment which the person has. This
is a pre-eminent force
since, information about the
environment

(the physical, human

or unknown)

is always fused

to form values.

with the process of actualization

This information about the
environment

comes in the form of organized and
classified knowledge of

man's accumulated past (immanence of
the culture) present
and future. While the actualization of
the potentialities
in man cannot be understood apart from
his inner pressure
and propensity to become, the structuring
of the actualized
potentials form values and is guided in the ultimate

analysis,

by the subjective aims, purposes, or "lure" from
the environment.

These aims and purposes, either of the developing

individual, or of the society,' or both, in turn become the

determinants of human behavior.

The behavioral and social

sciences define these as preferences, needs and goals. 6

disciplines in humanities define them as "oughts."

The

With

proper use of energy (values) man can delay his satisfactions.

5.

Patterned expressions of these aims and purposes can
be termed as ideals.

6.

The "ideational, idealistic and sensate values" of
Sorokin (1941) refer to the quality of the lure that
guide the structuring of the actualized potential
of the society as a whole, while Maslow’s (1959)
"hierarchy of values" in his theory of motivation
and personality refer to the needs, aims, and purposes
that structure the energy of the individual.
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fix his mind and behavior to
distant and unrealized goals,
strivings and ideals. Thus a
value-ideal relationship is

rather reciprocal, one reinforcing
the other.
Any prioritization of needs, aims, and purposes
consequently gives
rise to a hierarchy in value and
value systems and will be
reflected in corresponding changes in behavior.

Validation of Aims and Purposes
Values and value systems are viable only to
the extent
that the needs, aims and purposes that serve as
lure for
the structuring of the actualized potential, are
objectively

validated.

coherence of

Needless to emphasize that the efficacy and
a

comprehensive theory of value, irrespective

of the discipline that formulates it, hinges on this criteria
of objective validation, as has already been shown in the

case of Hartman’s axiology and the value inquiry of cultural

anthropologists.

One must appeal to some basis of objective

validity or argue in

a circle.

The various behavioral sciences have performed

a

valuable service in describing the factors and conditions
that shape human behavior.

Even if the social sciences

discover in detail the various patterns of behavior which
reflect certain values derived from specific aims and
purposes, it does not necessarily mean that these values
ought to be the ethically right ones toward which human

behavior is aimed.

As Margenau contends:
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a araursa,- F«

Hr

;
cumstances at a given time of the
evolutionary
process we should still have no
basis f^ ^Linv
<> uallt y
of
actions (Margenau ind Oslanyan,
1969) ?

We have practically no conceptual
guidelines within
the framework of a value theory in
educational practice
for assessing the extent to which the
determinants of

human behavior, e.g., attitude, value, value
system, aim,
purpose, and consequently human behavior itself,
has objective
validity. Each mode of behavior may be judged as
the cor-

rect one on its own right.

Even if we contend that the

ethical or axiological correctness of a behavior or the

appropriateness of an aim or purpose (chosen to be the lure
for structuring the actualized potential) may be judged by
the consequences it engenders, then we have to be able to

evaluate the worth of the consequences and the objective

structure of worth has to come from some other source.

Values,

along with their antecedents and consequents, should obtain
the ultimate validation from some other dimension of human

reality.

It

would be wrong to assume that to desire a

particular consequence is itself wrong, for what is worthy
and what is desired, may often coincide.

The essential

idea is that distinction must be made between values

structured by lures that happen to be mere interests, needs
and desires and those based on goals and purposes which
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have objective worth based on
human realities. There is a
decisive difference between wanting
something and affirming
its worth.
If what is worth or good is
defined as what gives

satisfaction, pleasure or success, and
when we act on that
axiom we commit a blunder which Moore
called the "naturalistic
fallacy” of identifying fact with value.
To avoid this
blunder, the meaning of desirable and worthy
consequences
or goals must be interpreted as an IDEAL.
It means a state
of affairs that is worth bringing into
existence and to be

devoutly hoped for.
actuality, not
realized,
1964, p.

a

a

An ideal may be defined here as "not an

fact, a possibility that ought to be

potentiality it is desirable to actualize” (Phenix,

230)

Objective validity in value inquiry requires an ideal
or set of ideals to serve as standards of references, for

ideals make absolute demands in both thought and action.

Nexus between ideals and values

.

Ideals constantly

remould the patterns of human values (patterned of expression of energy

-

the structure of actualized potential)

Ideals themselves are constantly rethought and refashioned
as

they necessarily remake man and society through new value

orientations, new appraisal of social roles and moral relations.
This demands imagination of the highest order backed by

constant readiness for fresh scrutiny and criticism of values.
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Such practical use of an
ideal as
Mitchell (1925), corresponds

a

goad, according to

to the analytical method
in

logic and mathematics.

An ideal is a mental
construct

embodying a situation which, if
actualized, would mean the
solution of the problem. Just
as a hypothesis is a
mental
construct in which facts find
their explanation,
the ideal

is a mental construct in
which subjective aims, needs, and

purposes find their fulfillment.

Ideals integrate elements

of values at various dimensions
and are the life and substance of the healthy individual. As
Bonner puts it:

"Without ideals man is not fully human,
for the
C
hum ness ls the capacity to envision
and aactualize
r °f.
ideal ends."
(Bonner, 1965, p. 7.)

“

As Mukherjee writes:

The ideal is a gestalt a holistic entity,
It cuts
across the biological, the social and the
metaphysical
dimensions of human living and reconciles and
integrates the polarities and contradictions involved
there in.
As it creates new values and coordinates
and transforms new values in a new dimensional
setting
and through a new dialectic, it refines and reframes
a new situation, carrying with it deeper
ego~involve ment, higher moral commitment and fresher intellectual
outlook.
(Mukherjee, 1964, p. 93 .)
,

Ideals as working hypothesis in value theory

.

Many

moral philosophers have tried to develop a system of

objective validity in questions of ethics from simple
postulates concerning human goals and ideals.

The telling

characteristic of all such endeavor says Margenau is that
"by themselves they remain ineffective" and goes on to add:
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^

ethical system has never come nut 0 r
n
records that Van's go^is
happiness° That knowledge is simDlv
nappmess.
not
to guide man's action
inspeliliccircSms^ces
"Lt1
if a principle claiming that
happiness is man's*
desirable goal were used as a
criterion of val d tv
for the actually occur ing
patt^Fns of behavior the
ethical enterprise could be satisfactorily
completed
emp ri a
£ Ct
° f actual b ^avior could
then be*
ro
™n
5
J
?
compared with the ideal protocol
behavior
defined
by the principle of happiness ... the
scientific
process is successful when the particular
inferences
fa system agree with protocol experiences.
The
ethical process is successful when actual
behavior
agrees with ideal protocol behavior.
In the former
oase, scientific theory is verified; in
the later,
ethical norms are validated (Margenau,
1969, p. 169).
-

-

The importance of using desired goals and
ideals as

objective standards for validation of values is emphasized
also by Mukherjee:
It will be of immense advantage for social science
to envisage carefully defined and controlled goals,

standards and ideals, and then reach back from the
complete ideal to the necessary social conditions
and the intermediate means. The way will then be
prepared for bringing into existence the necessary
social conditions and to furnish the means for the
realization of the ideal by desirable changes....
Ideals, accordingly, are the working hypotheses of
the social sciences, frames of reference, that guide
and regulate goals and behavior as integral parts of
a universal and unlimited frame (Mukherjee, 1964,
p

.

94)

There may be doubts if we can ever validate in any objective way (by use of methods similar to the natural sciences)
the significance and goals of human action and ideals which

appear to be so intensively personal.

However, current
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rethinking in the methods of
scientific inquiry 7 allows for
a new paradigm for
scientific inquiry, more liberal
than
ever before,
that it allows the inquiry
"to harbor certain
ideals, non-empirical concerns
regarding its product" (Mar-

m

genau, 1969).

The position taken here is that for
educational purposes and psychological health of the
individual and the
societies around the world, we need a new
accent on values
that transcends human wants and that any
value laden enterprise, like education for example, makes sense
only when

there are, as Phenix succinctly puts it, "objective
ex-

cellences that invite the loyalties of men and constitute
the standard and goals of human endeavor"
p.

5).

(Phenix,

1961,

It is not my intent to claim that we all know what

ultimate good is, nor is it that it is possible to have con-

gruency of opinions universally on ethical questions and
value judgments.

But it is my intent to speculate that

any serious concern to find out and act on what is right

rests on the convictions derived from transcendent ideals
--

7.

objective standards of worth upon which universal

There are certain metaphysical requirements which
the basic constructs of any field of scientific
inquiry must fulfill in order to become genuine
elements of a theoretical science; criteria such
as internal logical consistency "fertility,
simplicity and elegance" in their formulation are
as important as the ability to generate empirically
verifiable hypothesis (Margenau, 1950, pp. 75-101).
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agreement, at least in
principle, is possible.
The term ideal is used
here in a very broad
sense to
cover beliefs, values, goals,
purposes, and aims, scientific
moral or spiritual.
Ideals are real phenomena
and are part
of man’s psycho- social
equipment.
Before new factual

’

knowledge can become effective,
it must be organized, incorporated with or related to an
ideal.
Ideals grow out of
our experiences, as patterns
of the way we structure our
unknowns in the environment -physical, human and unknown
and may differ a great deal
in what may be called their
scientific or objective validation.
Whether validated or
not by any method, ideals can still
exert strong psychosocial effects:
for instance, the ideal of "civil
dis-

obedience" of Mahatma Ghandi or Martin
Luther King, Jr.
But in the long run only those ideals
will prevail which are

scientifically validated and are backed by well
established
factual knowledge.
The present study suggests a basis for understanding
the nature of ideals from the knowledge accumulated
through

the studying of evolution of man and that any paradigm for
the scientific inquiry in the domain of human values should

include the concept of ideals in its postulates.

The

following chapter will be devoted to the question of how our

present-day knowledge of evolution has given us

a

new concept

of man and his destiny, hitherto left untapped for incorpora-

tion into a theory of value for educational purposes.

CHAPTER

VI

UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS OF
BECOMING:
ROLE OF BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES
The ancient Chinese realized
that man's quest for
relevance at all times, no matter
how illumined he becomes,
will always center around three
basic and distinct areas of
interest, viz., man versus nature,
man versus man, and man
versus his own 'self.' The integrated
knowledge gained in
pursuit of these interests affords the
basis for a comprehensive philosophy of man, which in turn
then serves as the
basis for understanding the process of
his becoming.
The spectacular advances in the biological
sciences

have made significant contributions to our
understanding of
the nature of man and the meaning of order
and disorder as
they relate to his growth in his environment.

The light

thrown on the significance of time in the process of
man's

becoming is one of the chief contributions of the biological
sciences.

Everything has

a

past from which it has emerged

and a future toward which it moves, and hence all things

man and mankind inclusive -- are immersed in
process of change in a continuum along

a

a

ceaseless

time dimension

towards some ultimate goal or in accordance with some ulti-

mate purpose.
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Scope of Evolutionary Biology

While all things, animate and
inanimate, fall somewhere along the above continuum,
the study of living things
makes this process of change more
observable.
It is mainly
from the study of living entities
that the great
idea of

evolution sprang

--

an idea that appears to be applicable

to everything in the universe.

Though theories of cosmic

and terrestrial evolution have appeared in
the VISHNU PURANA
of the ancient Hindus, biological evolution
has been the

subject of intense study of the theoretical
biologists over
the last century.

The advent of Darwin is rooted in our

minds to such extent that few can conceive of any other
nonhis torical

,

non-evolutionary or non-developmental approach

to the study of any phenomenon.

Pitrim Sorokin admits:

The stand point of 'origin, development and evolution' is
our mainstay in studying anything from religion to the

stock market.”

Teilard de Chardin affirms that position:

evolution a theory, a system, or a hypothesis?
it is a general postulate to which
all theories, all hypotheses, all systems must henceforward bow and which they much satisfy in order to
be thinkable and true.
Evolution is a light which
illuminates all facts, a trajectory which all lines
of thought must follow -- this is what evolution is
(Teilard de Chardin, 1965, p. 219).
Is

It is much more --

The term "evolution," which has been given the meaning

"sustained change" in biological literature, has been more
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recently 1 defined succinctly as
7 lrreversible process, in time, which
duringg
itQ rn
gene T ate novelty, diversity and
?
higher
V
S
organization.
It operates in all sectors
n
of.r ?J
the °f

phenomenal universe but has been most
fully

Evolution, then in the broadest sense of
the word, is
the name we assign to the comprehensive
plan or sequence in
all events, ideas and thought.
In biology, the
idea that

is

central to the evolution of organisms is that
everything

is

what is by virtue of a process of growth and
development

involving

a

long chain of interrelated antecedents.

Theoretical understanding of how the various species
of living things came into being and inquiry into the nature
of the processes in their temporal development is the theory
of evolution.

The original concepts of Charles Darwin, viz., inheri-

table variations, adaptative and natural selection, have

been abundantly confirmed, elaborated and often improved
upon by investigation over the past century by the study
of fossils (macroevolution) and also by the study of

1.

Over fifty of the world's leading experts on evolution worked out this definition during the proceedings
of a convention of scientists from all over the world
in 1950, sponsored by the University of Chicago to
celebrate the one hundredth anniversary of the publication of Darwin’s Origin of the Species
.
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invertebrates

--

submicroscopic living organisms

bacteria, viruses or fungi
(microevolution)
observes

eVOlU

.

1

ike

As Dobzhansky

^° and macroe °lution are parts of a
«l^?
single continuum and studies of
the former helD to
n

d
latter
After all the knowledge
Iboui ^: S*
r
°-r
f the at0m 0btai " 0 d inside
the
four wa^?s
? w ra 0
h3S helped in understanding
the evolJtinn
!
evolution of rw°
the stellar
systems (Dobzhansky,
>

£

^

1958).

Macroevolution cannot be observed at work;
we observe only
the end products of its action in
our lifetime.

However, a

phage biochemist or a geneticist can
study microevolution
in his laboratory in his lifetime.

Today there is a strong consensus that the
Darwinian
view of evolution can be characterized by the
following
two postulates:

?

a)

that all events that lead to a production of new
genotype, such as mutation, recombination and
fertilization, are essentially random and not
in any way selected, and

b)

that the order in the organic world manifested in
the numerous adaptations of organisms to the
physical and biotic environment, is due to the
ordering effect of natural selection (Mayr, 1962,
p.

85).

For a biologist the animal, plant, or micro-organism
he is working with is but a link in an evolutionary chain

2.

This is sometimes called 20th century Darwinism or a
synthetic theory of evolution, so called because it
is a new synthesis from all fields of biology and
not an offspring of any one of the numerous preceding
theories
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Of changing forms, none
of which has any guarantee
of permanence. Hence for him there
is hardiy an
y structure or
function in an organism that
can be fully understood
unless
it is studied against this
background. The study of evolution teaches us certain modesty
in our ability to make
accurate statements about the
nature of man; anything
affirmed about his nature should
be done with implied understanding and a qualification -"at this point of his growth
and development along the
evolutionary line..." With this

tentativeness comes an attitude of
expectancy concerning
new human possibilities that may emerge
as evolution proceeds
As Phenix states:

Biology fosters a view of man as engaged
in a contmuing adventure drawn on to new levels of
fulfillment by the lure of future possibilities.
The human
future is open rather than closed. Moreover,
the
evolutionary picture shows that man's beings and
becomings are intimately connected. Man is what he has
become; and his present being is what it is by virtue
of the long struggle for more successful adaptation
to the environment.
Therefore, the individual becoming of man and the evolutionary becoming of mankind
are mutually illuminating -- an insight embodied in
the old dictum that "ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny"
*
7
(Phenix, 1964, p. 31).

Present-day biologists' contributions to our understanding of the nature of man and his own place in the
universe, represent a convergence, synthesis and interpre-

tation of all biological disciplines, e.g., genetics,

paleontology, embryology.

Theoretical biology is concerned

with interpreting the logic and methodology of the science
of living organisms; since it establishes the foundations of
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biological knowledge, it may be
said to form a branch of
logic and epistemology. Theoretical
physics, now a well
established discipline, has its own
speculations about the
nature of the physical universe and
this in turn
has pro-

found consequences for dealing with
problems of general
philosophy. Only recently have we been
able to notice the
relevance of biological topics, such as
the mechanisms of
evolution or mechanisms of perception, to the
branches of

philosophy.

We can now see the role of theoretical
biology

in providing a critical, reflective and
methodological

clarification which will serve as
stition, dogma and fallacy.

a

bulwark against super-

Albert Schweitzer

(

1947 ) once

wrote that our age has discovered how to divorce knowledge
from thought, with the result that we have indeed

a

science

which is free, but hardly any science left that reflects
Biology is in

a

position to assume

a role of

.

reflection in

assisting man in his quest for meaning.

Understanding the mechanisms of man’s evolution,
biological and cultural, has ethical, ideological and
philosophical implications that are far reaching.

The main

question which evolutionists are concerned with is whether
cosmic, human and biological evolution are three unrelated

entities, or, are integral parts of a single process of

evolution.

To be more specific, are biological, mental

(psychological) and cultural evolution of the human species
stages of a single universal process?

In the emergence of

84

man has the emphasis of
evolution been shifted from the
biologic and organic to the
psychological and the cultural?
What light does evolutionary
biology throw on the problem
of
purpose and teleological explanations
in biological organisms?
Since man is the only known product
of evolution that can
make a distinction between what is
from what ought to he
does the study of his evolution
clarify for us the nature
of the good at which he should aim?
Does it enable us to
.

understand more precisely the meaning of moral
judgments
concerning what ought and ought not to be done?
Is

man's

ethical judgment, and consequently his behavior,
related to
his own evolutionary growth?
Is there any purpose in human

evolution?

These, none will deny, become poignant issues of

personal and social urgency, too critical to be left ignored.
While dealing with the above issues in depth is beyond
the scope of this dissertation, however, summaries of a few

of the most impressive contributions which have relevance to
a study of these issues will be dealt with in the following

pages.
a)

These contributions fall into the following categories

Mechanisms of human evolution in contradiction
to pre-human evolution.

b)

Pathways adopted by organisms to maintain their

identity at any one point in its evolution amidst
constant change in the environment.
c)

Our understanding of the reasons for the biological uniqueness of man.
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d)

Speculations about the emergence
of new possibilities of patterns and
organization for collective evolution of mankind and
the vector of the
direction of this evolution.

Mechanisms of the Human Evolutionary
System
The biological evolutionary system
as seen today can
be envisaged as a synthesis of
the classical theory of

evolution by natural selection, an idea
which for the first
time crystallized the problem of
cumulative change
in the

biological world, and the advances in Mendelian
genetics.
Contemplative analysis of the idea of "survival of
the

fittest

which plagued the minds of post Darwinian evolu-

tionists, wedded to the concept of natural selection,
led to
the understanding that the crucial matter is not survival

but hereditary transmission of genes and most important of
the nature of the interactions between the environment

and the biological organism in which these genes are carried.
To obtain a better picture of the evolutionary mechanism,

Waddington proposed

a

system involving four factors:

A genetic system, which engenders new variation by
the process of mutation and transmits it by chromosomal genes; an epigenetic system, which translates
the information in the fertilized egg and that which
impinges on it from the environment into the characters
of the reproducing adult; an exploitive system, by
which an animal chooses and modifies the environment
to which it will submit itself; and a system of natural
selective pressures originating from the environment
and operating on the combined result of the other
three systems (Waddington, 1960, p. 94).
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Soc io-Genetic System .

While all the above factors
of

the biological evolutionary
system undoubtedly persist
in
the human situation, an
extraordinarily important step
characterizes his evolution and
this accounts for his unique

ability to undergo acculturation,
change his mode of
thinking, living, etc., without a
corresponding genetic
change in his biological make up. As
Huxley describes

it:

In this. phase a new mechanism
of continuity and

Ke“ri963“p.

S

S)f'

Varl,ti0n ° f mind 3nd ltS P roducts

It operates by what anthropologists
call a cultural system,

involving the transmission using elaborate
symbol systems of
cumulative, organized experience, conceptual knowledge,
beliefs, feelings and aspirations of the previous
generation

made available to the succeeding ones.

In effect a new mode

of heredity transmission, which Waddington designates as

socio-genetic system," is in operation in human evolution
in

contradistinction to pre-human evolution.

This does not

imply that biological evolutionary mechanism found in pre-

humans has ceased to operate in man, nor does it mean that
genes are irrelevant, and as Dobzhansky puts it:

The genetic equipment of mankind endows it with
a capacity of cardinal importance, that to acquire
and to transmit from generation to generation the
knowledge and the skills to control the environment.
Every succeeding generation can, if it so chooses
stand on shoulders of the preceding ones and aspire
to ever greater attainments.
The emergence of this
genetic equipment was the evolutionary masterstroke
which placed our species at the summit of the living
,
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world. .. .The autonomy of cultural P vn
mean that an impenetLble waU
tepa^ates ^ur
rom our genes.
The autonomy of culture meanscuUu?n
that
ra ‘ k
Sib e they d °
determine
ui »5?“?. Iiif
1 S°?
i
Similarly
human
caDacitv of
nf speech, but they do genes determine the
capacity
not determine what
( Dobzhans ky,
1959, pp. 79,81).
(Emphasis
mine?)

Evolutionary biology has thus brought
to

a

sharp focus the

existence of a non-genetical system of
heredity in man and
has placed the onus for his evolution
on the powers of his
brain and consciousness and not that of
his body (Huxley,
1953).

Human advancement, henceforth, does not
depend on
the Darwinian concept of "survival of
the fittest”

involv-

ing ruthless physical competition in fighting
the environ-

ment and in fulfilling drives and instincts as seen
in the
pre-human evolution.
as

The direction of human development

portrayed by Darwin gave no ontologically ingrained

purpose either in nature or in whole man as

a

creature of

nature.

3.

One of the greatest neurologists, Herrick, has shown
that in the course of the evolutionary development
of life, the motor apparatus took the lead.
All
plants and the most primitive animals function without
nervous systems.
In the course of the development of
man, the motor apparatus took precedence over the
other parts (Herrick, 1956)
.

88

H uxley's Humanism

4
.

Many thinkers have impressively

attempted to exploit this new
understanding of human evolution given by evolutionary biology
for guidance as to how
human affairs should be conducted
in the future.
Julian
Huxley s humanist philosophy as
elaborated in several of his
writings stems from such an understanding
of human evolution
'

(1953,

1963, 1964, 1971).

Evolutionary biology has undoubtedly contributed

a

great deal to our knowledge about man and
his environment
and offers a scientific prognosis of man's
future.

We

know now more about man's nature and his potentialities.

If

man has potentialities to be actualized, then man,
in the
first place, must have the tremendous potentiality of

evolving; he is individually and collectively not an end
state but a process.

Biological evolution of man has led

to a higher order of evolution sometimes referred to as

cultural evolution, and very definitively, as Huxley contends, evolution is now passing from a stage determined

primarily by the biological process of natural selection to
one determined by conscious effort.

4.

The cultural evolution

The humanist tradition comes to modern man from the
ancient world of Greeks, who first developed the
conception of life guided by reason and later on
during the 18th century provided the core of the
modern idea of progress. The humanist tradition
developed man's faith in his own reasoning powers
-- in his ability to govern himself, solve his own
problems and improve his way of life.
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of mankind is superimposed
on its biological evolution
and
the stages of the former are
non-biological without be ing
contrary to the laws of the latter.

The significance of cultural
evolution can hardly be
exaggerated. The development of
the languages and literatures of the world, of media of
mass communication, of
science and technology, have altered
immeasurably man's
mode of existence.

What is of particular significance is
man’s increased
potential for guiding the course of future
evolution.
He
has certainly gained powers, through
his understanding of
the mechanisms underlying natural phenomena
and of the means

of predicting and controlling natural events,
to make the

bearers of certain genotypes more or less successful in
survival and reproduction.
The human condition is changing both culturally and

biologically.
the biological,

Although the cultural evolution overshadows
the two are connected by feedback relation-

ships; culture has a biological foundation.

Natural selec-

tion continues to operate in a modern mankind, but its

action is supplemented by artificial selection.

The problems

of the management of human evolution are, however, as much

sociological as they are biological.

The success of any

progress depends on the creation of favorable conditions
for human development and self-actualization.

Mankind is

at a stage of cultural evolution which tests the evolutionary
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strategy that led to man.

His choices are crucial and
agon-

izing. but he cannot defer them
or avoid them.

Even the

deliberate suppression of rational
behavior, as Ravin writes,
is a choice and will have
evolutionary consequences (Ravin,
1970).

What is of particular significance
is man's increased
potential for guiding the course of human
evolution.
In
fact, as Huxley sees it, it is difficult
to imagine how man,
given his present powers and the rate of
acquiring and

transmitting knowledge, can possibly avoid intervening
in
further evolution.
Commenting on the knowledge explosion as
a

result of socio-genetic transmission since the advent
of

Darwin, Huxley writes:
Its upshot is clear.
Man is not merely the latest
dominant type produced by evolution, but its sole
active agent on earth. His destiny is to be responsible for the whole future of the evolutionary process
on this planet.
Whatever he does, he will affect
that process.
His duty is to try to understand it
and the mechanisms of its working, and at the same
time direct and steer it in the right direction
and along the best possible course.
This is the gist and core of Evolutionary Humanism,
the new organization of ideas and potential action
now emerging from the Humanist Revolution of thought,
and destined, I prophesy with confidence, to become
the dominant idea-system of the next and critical
phase of psychosocial evolution (Huxley, 1971)

Human evolution then implies the transformation and

education of his primitive animal nature in larger and
larger measure so that the becoming man shapes further the

evolution of his own nature in terms of the ideals, goals,
and values he prizes, selects, and nurtures.

This means

the creation and transmission of ideals that come to
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determine the paths of his evolution.

In essence,

then,

human evolution cannot be understood
unless values are
understood in terms of his yet to be actualized
potentialities and evolutionary possibilities.
Social Homeorhesis

What is distinct about living things is not only
the
fact that they develop but the manner and direction
of the

development.

Organisms are characterized by their ability

to preserve constancy in the midst of change.

Living matter

has the astonishing power of duplicating itself by incor-

porating materials from the environment according to the

pattern of its own being or true identity.

Homeostatic

mechanisms within each organism keep it alive by enabling
it to adjust itself so that the conditions of viability are

always met.

The capacity of living matter to keep adjusted

in this way preserves its identity amidst changes.

This property of constancy amidst change is possible

primarily because living things are 'open systems.'

Accord-

ing to the second law of thermodynamics the energy transfor-

mation in

a

self-contained or closed physical system takes
-

place in such a way that entropy^ is increased.

1.

That is

Entropy refers to a measure of the randomness of ene rgy
distribution in a system or the degree of molecular
This measure gives a clue to the amount of
disorder.
unavailable energy in a system toward a useful purpose
served by the system.
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to say,

all energy changes in an
isolated mechanical system

proceed

m

direction of greater disorder.

a

Living organisms

by virtue of their being open
systems have the abili ty to
maintain themselves against disordering
influences.

(Bertalanf fy

,

1968.)

Living organisms are classified as open
systems because they exchange matter and energy with
their surroundings in such a way as to perpetuate themselves
and develop.
A fundamental ontological principle in all
living things is

then the conservation of an organic order.

In the case of

humans, the affirmation of existence or, put differently,
the will to live,

seems to be an inherent property.

Living things not only conserve order but they also
evolve toward more complex structures hierarchically

organized.

Piaget hypothesises:

"Life is essentially autoregulation.
The explanation
of evolutionary mechanisms, for so long shackled
to the inescapable alternatives offered by Lamarckism
and classical neo-Darwinism, seems set in the direction
of a third solution, which is cybernetic and is, in
effect biased toward the theory of autoregulation."
(Piaget, 1971, p. 26.)

And for him cognitive processes are results of such auto
regulation.

As Edmund Sinott points out in Cell and Psyche

,

what appears as organizing forces in the elementary forms of
life and as organic drives in the higher forms of pre-human

species manifests itself as conscious purpose in man.
(Sinott,

1950.)

The ubiquitous phenomenon which characterizes self-control,
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regulation and maintenance found at
every level of biological organization - nuclear,
nucleolic, cytoplasmic,
organellic cellular, glandular, somatic,
was termed
homeostasis by the famous Harvard biologist
Cannon ( 1932 ),
and may be defined as the ability of
the organism to com,

pensate for the changes in its environment,
both micro and
macro, to compensate for changes in such ways
that its

normal functioning proceeds undiminished.

Homeostasis

within the body includes regulation of body
temperature,
water, concentration of salt, sugar and other
nutrients.
For instance if too much carbon dioxide, accumulates
in
the blood,

the animal breathes faster to absorb more oxygen

thus removing carbon dioxide until the balance is restored.

Such a restoration of the status quo is homeostasis.

Such

regulative mechanisms of self correction are operative in
any system, open or closed, which has a specific function
or purpose.

Servomechanisms designed by man have homeo-

static controls built into them.

In the case of evolution

or development what is restored is not the 'status quo' but
the normal path and direction of change.

Waddington proposed

the term "homeorhesis"^ for such a situation where there is

return to the original path of development rather than

a

return to an original stabilized state

1

.

.

The homeorhetic

Derived from Greek word 'flow' to replace 'stasis'
which implies standing still.

a
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mechanism serves to bring back the
organism to the stabilized
necessary path of development or
evolution.

These paths or

trajectories are termed "chreods" 1
by Waddington (1969).
This intuitive leap of the creative
embryologist in introducing a new nomencleture to represent
genuinely the mechanism of autoregulation in a developing
(becoming) entity,

brings new dimensions in organismic biology
while it allays
the fear of those who attributed
mechanistic connotations
to the concept of homeostasis.

For eg., Bonner writes:

.As a mode of describing the adjustive
and protective

impulses of the individual, the homeostatic analogy
is convenient and useful, and it fits well
the excessive demand for simplicity and economy. However,
as a model for constructive behavior, it is
wholly
inadequate.
It can tell us much about the nature of
being, but next to nothing about the process of
becoming of man s hopes and dreams, aspirations and
longings, dedications and commitments. Homeostasis is
a static concept which conceals and distorts the
essence of psychological growth and becoming" (Bonner,
1965, p. 133).
(Emphasis mine.)
1

:

During development it is the richness and precisive

qualities of the environmental interactions, epigenetic
influences as Waddington would call them, that determine
the processes of developing, evolving (or becoming).

Any

activity guided by purpose has to have homeorhetic mechanisms which put the organism constantly in chreods which

lead to consummation of its intended goal (subjective aim).

1.

Derived from two Greek words meaning 'necessary
path.
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The energy derived, for
example, by the metabolism
of
nutrients are tapped by the
homeorhetic mechanism to put
the organism into chreods
leading to maintain
the bio-

logical integrity of the developing
organism over time.
According to Cannon (1932) in Wisdom
of the Body the
human body is impeccably unified
and integrated for one
single purpose - survival.
,

Whitehead affirms that "the life aim of
survival is
modified to human aim of survival for
diversified worthwhile experiences" (1938, p. 43).
It is

evident that mere

survival as the primary purpose of genetic
and physiological homeorhesis, is too narrow a conception
given their
limits, to serve as adequate mechanisms to
maintain the

chreods for psychological, social and spiritual
purposes
or ideals.

More significant in man’s evolution, then, are

the psychological and social homeorhetic mechanisms which

have to be learned and acquired; thus, such mechanisms
are dependent on socio-genetic transmission which has

definite effects on non-biological evolution.

The concept

of homeorhesis as it relates to social advancement and

human evolution is tacit in our minds.

Terms like self-

control, security, self-fulfillment, cooperation, peace,

tranquility which carry implications of homeorhesis indicate
that although the term may be new the concept is not.

Certain principles established in organismic biology
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are transferable to social sciences
and some of the gener-

alizations made especially from the study
of mammalian
group behavior have been substantiated
in anthropological
and sociological studies in communities
around the world.
Social progress can then be equated with
increased homeorhesis
or integration arising out of mutual
cooperation which is
the key to individual and group evolution.

(Emerson, 1954,

1960.)

Energy spent in an inorganic system is toward disintegration while in living organisms

--

open systems

--

the energy is spent toward integration in the direction of

higher order, of more complexity of greater specialization
in organization.

Increasing complexity in organisms is

possible only when cells begin to coordinate their functions
and activity in some way, i.e., increased homeorhesis in
the organism as a whole.

A degree of specialization is

a

prime requisite for any efficient operation and to evolve

progressively, human societies must produce greater functional efficiency, i.e., increased social homeorhesis.

Whitehead writes:
Universe achieves its values by reason of its
coordination into societies of societies, and in
societies of societies of societies. Thus an army
is a society of regiments, and regiments are societies
of men, and men are societies of cells, and of blood,
and of bones, together with the dominant society of
personal human experience, and cells are societies of
small physical entities such as protons, and so on.
’’The
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Also all of these societies
presuppose the circumambient
° f social Physical activity"
(Whitehead
1967, p.
One important element in this
process of integrated
action - cooperation - is the moral
value for the individual
unit taking part in the process.
Cooperation as a form of
social homeorhesis is the method by which
all living beings
a social system facilitate
the proper channelling of their

m

collective energy derived from their actualized
potentialities
in ways which are mutually beneficial.
Human Evolution and

a

Vision of the Future ^

While the ethical, ideological and epistemological

implications of our understanding of the mechanism of

human evolution have been brought to light by the works of

Dobzhansky

,

Huxley and Waddington, the contributions of

Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, hold preeminence and are of

particular significance to the scope of the present study,
for Teilhard stands as a formidable figure of a pioneer in
the forefront of attempts to relate evolution to man's

ultimate concerns.
All during his scientific career, which was devoted
to the study of geology, mammalian paleontology and anthropology,

5.

References given in this section are of Teilhard de
Chardin unless otherwise mentioned.
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and while engaged in numerous
travel adventures with prolonged stays in the orient Teilhard
de Chardin had a hidden

agenda constantly in his mind -- the
understanding of the
phenomenon of man, a creature caught
between immensity and
nothingness and understanding his place
in the universe.
His intellectual rigor and scientific
training, whatever
others may think or write about it.^
Since it is beyond the scope of the present
study even
to attempt to epitomize Teilhard's cosmology,
only
a

few

of the many issues that Teilhard addressed
will be dis-

cussed below in the form of propositions extracted from
his
works that have relevance for

a

comprehensive value theory

as envisaged by the ANISA Educational Model.

The parameter of complexity

.

The central theme of

Teilhard's scientific thinking was evolution

--

not just

biological but extended to encompass the whole of reality.
Outside the context of cosmogenesis

,

Teilhard believed

anthropogenesis could not be understood.

From his paleonto-

logical work on mammals he drew certain fundamental con-

clusions which he could convincingly generalize to aspects
of man's evolution and prognosis of man's future.

6.

He

In the estimation of both Simpson, the American
paleontologist and Medawar, the British biologist,
Teilhard ranked very low as a scientist (Simpson,
1960; Medawar, 1961).
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found that life was flexible and
progressive; being flexible
it was liable to change, and
being progressive, evolution
does not proceed in a random manner
but it is oriented.
As
to the nature and direction of
the orientation, Teilhard
concluded that the line of evolution
following the most complex brain (organized brain) was the most
successful and
this represented a privileged axis.
For him man marks the
end of one phase of development of created
things and the

beginnings of another new one.

He shows how our puny view

of man in the face of the limitless space and
expanding

universe can be completely reversed when we view
everything
from the chemical or biochemical aspect of complexity
and

organization (1966, p. 14-36).

For him the parameter of

complexity when used as the criteria enables one to distinguish a genetic classification of all creations that have
evolved during eons of time.

Jean Piveatu commenting on

this grand scheme of Teilhard illumines Teilhard’s vision.

The order of complexity corresponds to their
chronological order of emergence. Now let us look
at the universe from this perspective.
Take the
biggest objects for a start -- the nebulae. Their
substance is extremely tenuous and is probably just
hydrogen; that is, the simplest element of matter:
one nucleus plus one electron.
Going up one step in immensity, we look at the
stars.
They are much more complex compared with the
nebulae.
But stars do not go beyond a certain stage;
they are the laboratories where nature manufactures
atoms from primeval hydrogen -- nothing more.
It is on the dark planets alone -- and nowhere
else -- that we have the opportunity to pursue this
mysterious ascent of the world towards higher complexities and where the evolutionary effort devoted

100

principally to the manufacture of large
molecules will
henceforth be concentrated.
Amo n g these planets, at any rate, in
our solar
system, earth is probably the only one
which is lifeng
ma be the sole ce nter where the
synthesis
n? i!
^
'

r?e m eC les goes on and the living
V
creatures
^* 2
v ?which
inhabit
it probably represent M the most complex
compositions to emerge from planetary geochemistry."
ihus, life no longer looks like a dirty
stain
upon some tiny point in space but appears as
"the
specific effect of the complexif ication of matter"
(Piveatu, 1971, p. 181).
1

>

Thresholds of evolution

.

Concentrating on the planet

earth, Teilhard shows that billions of years of physio-

chemical evolution (geogenesis) followed by evolution of
life (biogenesis) had to precede the emergence of thought
of consciousness leading to psycho- social evolution

(noogenesis)

,

and these three distinct stages of planetary

evolution represent

a

single but succeeding and progressive

evolution in one unitary direction.

Although the parameter of increasing complexity enables us to find

a

meaning in the evolution of the universe,

it is not sufficient,

as Teilhard tells us,

to determine

the direction of evolution after the appearance of life
(1965)

.

The more complex the living organism, the more

complex, self-centered and self-conscious it becomes.
a

Such

form of complexity is determined due to the organ con-

trolling the perception of the organism, the brain.

The

only way of evaluating the quality of the organ is by the
level of organization.

For him since man is the only
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conscious animal with the most organized
brain in this
planet, he is necessarily the most valuable
creation.

Teilhard (1966,

p.

22)

succinctly portrays this in his

uniquely represented 'curve of complexity'

(Fig.

II)

in

which the Y axis represents in centimeters
the diameter of
the principle objects in nature identified so
far by
science from the smallest to the largest.

The X axis

represents an attempt to express conceptually the degree
of

complexity in aggregates of matter.

Evolutionary series considered by Teilhard represents
three thresholds.

The threshold between matter, life and

man and new qualities emerge as evolution progresses through
these thresholds.

This view is in complete accord with the

views of emergent evolutionists, e.g., Morgan, who hold
that evolution of the stuff of the universe accounts for

new properties including life and consciousness.

7.

For

The importance of the concept of mind and consciousness in the behavioral sciences has
received attention only recently. Waddington
observes
"So long as mind remains a phenomenon unmentioned
in the vocabulary of the physical sciences, one
can have no complete confidence that the stock of
concepts at present used in those disciplines will
ever be able to encompass it." After this cautions
understatement, he rightly emphasizes the positive
duty of science to tackle "all aspects of the
phenomena of life, including mind" (Waddington,
1957, p. 1)
.

NATURAL CURVE OF COMPLEXITIES*
A.

POINT OF VITALISATION

B.

POINT OF HOMINISATION
(CONSCIOUS REFLECTION)

FIG
*

H

•

Man’s Place in Nature
Teilhard de Chardin.
p"i
Harper and Row, 1966
New York:
.

.
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Morgan who recognized three
kinds of natural systems,
matter, life and mind, evolution
is a progressive

advance

with novelty or the actualization
of the unrealized possi
bilities

According to emergent evolution, as I
seek to
develop its thesis, there is an increasing
hierarchy
of kinds of orders of relatedness
ranging from
those that obtain
the atom, in the molecule, in
the crystal and so on near the base
pyramid, to that
° rd
° £ reflec iv e consciousness
near the apex
?£
J
y

m

m

(Morgan,

1927, p.

148).

True to the tradition of emergent evolutionists
deM
fining progress, Teilhard writes:
Let me here repeat the
two fundamental equations or equivalents which
we have

established:
Progress

=

growth of consciousness

Growth of Consciousness
(1959, p.

,

-

effect of organization

72)

'Planetization M of humanity

.

Having given

a

version

of the evolution of the human mind, he also gives us

a

vision of the ultimate condition of the earth and the trend
of planetary evolution.

The trend prevailing in the evol-

ution of the noosphere, sphere of consciousness and selfreflection,

(the noogenesis)

is toward what Teilhard desig-

nates as "planetization" and "megasynthesis" (1959).

This

implies radical convergence and integration of the physical,

cultural and ideological branches of mankind.

The mega-

synthesis is a gigantic psycho-biological operation in which
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love and cooperation is the main
agent leading to unity in
diversity.
As early as in 1920

(published only in 1959), Teilhard

wrote
It is mankind as a whole, collective
humanity,
which is called upon to perform the definitive
act whereby the total force of terrestrial
evolution will be released and flourish; an act
in
the £ul * consciousness of each individual man
•n?\be sustained by
will
that of every other man not
only living but the dead (1959).

Possibilities for the future

.

Having clarified our

ideas of the evolution of the mind and given us an idea of

future possibilities, Teilhard articulates the kind of

action such knowledge requires of us, for as he believed,
If progress

is to continue,

it will not do so on

its own accord.
If indeed an almost limitless field of action lies
open to us in the future, what shall our moral dispositions be, as we contemplate this march ahead?
I can think of two, which may be summarized in
six words:
a great hope held in common
.

a)

b)

First, the hope....
A passionate longing
to grow, to be, is what we need.
There
can be no place for the poor in spirit,
the skeptics, the pessimists, the sad of
heart, the weary and the immobilists.
Life is ceaseless discovery.
Life is
movement.
A hope held in common. Here again the
history of Life is decisive. Not all
directions are good for our advance: one
alone leads upward, that which through
increasing organization leads to
Life moves
greater synthesis and unity....
towards unification. Our hope can only be
realized if it finds its expression in
greater cohesion and greater human solidarity
(1959, p. 75)
.

CHAPTER VII
BIOLOGICAL DIMENSION TO THE VALUE
THEORY
OF THE ANISA MODEL

Road Traversed
Both the crises in the social sciences and
lack of
communication among those who are involved with the
study
of human values, demand an integrated statement
of value

theory based on empirical and theoretical developments in

various branches of human knowledge concerned with values.
It has become evident that educational objectives cannot
be

adequately conceived unless they are formulated in the light
of a value theory that affords a perspective on all problems

involved which the theory is designed to help solve.

Attention has been drawn in the previous chapters to
the need for a unified approach to the study of value

phenomenon since values are derived from all aspects of
human existence and experience, from one's self and one's

environment.

The potential impact of

a

comprehensive value

theory well grounded in both human actualities and possi-

bilities in understanding and guiding the process of man's
true becoming, has been recognized.

How values and value

systems are developed are studied in strikingly divergent
and piecemeal manner by various psychological and social

studies according to their conception of human nature and
destiny.

Man's views of himself and his world, whether
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validated or not, are the primary
determinants of his behavior.
Perspectives obtained from current
theories reviewed
in chapters three, four, and five,
point
out to one basic

concern.

No matter how comprehensive becomes
our under-

standing of the value phenomena, value
systems and the conditions and contexts in which they arise, we
still need a
set of conceptual guidelines from some
other dimension
of human reality which will serve as general
frame of

reference to validate the postulates of

a

value theory.

A

case is made in chapter five for broadening the paradigm
of

value inquiry, irrespective of nature of the discipline

which initiates it, by including the concepts of subjective
aim and ideals^ which in the ultimate analysis serve as the

blueprint for structuring actualized potentiality
creating values.

-

for

For as expressed by Whitehead

"the life of a human being receives its worth,
its importance, from the way in which unrealized
ideals shape its purposes and tinge its actions.
(Whitehead, 1938, p. 27.)

The views obtained on the nature of man and his destiny

from the vantage point of modern theories of biological

evolution as represented by the works of Huxley, Waddington
and Teilhard de Chardin, have been the main thrust of

1.

Pages 12-15.
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chapter five, the salient
aspects of which can be
summarized
as follows:
a)

ac ount 0* life is continuous
?
progressive advance into novelty
marked by stages of increasing
levels of oreaniovln 2 irreversibly toward
higher forms
hlch ]J
ha e new and distinguishing
properties
h
^ m n
Se of
consciousness
2 has emerged as
^
oJp^f
one
of ??
the most important new
and has
made possible the creation of properties
a cuUure t?ans
missible to succeeding generations
through
5
learning.
,

Y

f

2.

b)

Man, because he is a cultural and
conscious social
being has already influenced and will
continue
to influence the future of his own
evolution as
a species.

c)

Evolutionary progress in biological organisms,
including man, can be equated with improved
homeorhesis within the ecosystem of the universe.

d)

Human evolution has become the quest for perfection through consciously determined goals and
ideals which in themselves become determinants
of the homeorhetic path and thereby effective
instruments in the evolution of humankind.

e)

Man will meet the greatest challenge in the course
of his biological and cultural history as he tries
to understand himself, appreciate the future
possibilities open to him, and begins to take
an active and deliberate hand in shaping his own
destiny.

From the points of view of both Huxley and Teilhard de
Chardin, it may appear that evolution is nothing but
growth of consciousness.
It may be anthropocentric to
hold that consciousness to be of primary importance
and in my opinion the positions of the above two
scientists should be taken with the tacit understaning that this view is only relative to a truly
evolutionary cosmic perspective which is that consciousness represents only one quality of an infinite
number of qualities possible in the evolving universe.
Emergence of consciousness on earth as a natural
activity is only a recent event in a geological time
scale
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The above serve as empirical
and theoretical referents to the ANISA theory of
value, which is outlined
in
the following pages.
T heories of Evolution an d
Organismic Philosophy

The contributions of theoretical
biology whose sole
concern has been the problem of the
nature and evolution of
organization in living things, has tremendous
impact on
the age old philosophical quest of the
nature of reality
in the universe.
Sounding death knell to both mechanistic
and vitalistic views of the universe, the
empirical and

theoretical advances in evolutionary biology,
strengthen
the

organismic' view of the universe, thus supporting

a

major shift in the paradigm which fostered the mechanistic
conception of the universe originating from classical Newtonian physics.
The fundamental thread that runs through all the

advances in theoretical biology, which represents

a con-

vergence, synthesis and interpretation of break throughs of
all the biological disciplines, e.g., genetics, embryology,

paleontology and molecular biology, is the incontrovertible
evidence concerning the high degree or organizational com-

plexity in living things and idea that the reality of any
organism cannot be understood apart from its form of
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organization in the process of evolution.

3

From the biol-

ogist’s standpoint, the organic conception of the world
involves succession in time and in space; evolution is seen
as a creative advance into novelty characterized by a

progressive intensification of higher principles of life.
The cosmology of Alfred North Whitehead continues
to receive increasing support from the advances of modern

evolutionary theories.

Whitehead has always appreciated

the structure of our cosmos in terms of different ontological

levels.

His views regarding these levels are congruent

with those of Teilhard de Chardin expressed in his ’’curve
of complexity” (p. 102).

"In surveying nature, we must remember that there
are not only basic organisms whose ingredients are
merely aspects of eternal objects (i.e., the ultimate
particles of physics, each of which is related to
everything else in the universe by its bare coexistence). There are also organisms of organisms.
Suppose for the moment and for the sake of simplicity,
we assume, without any evidence, that electrons and
hydrogen nuclei are such basic organisms. Then the
atoms and the molecules are organisms of a higher
type, which also represent a compact definite organic
When we come to larger aggregations of matter,
unity.
It
the organic unity fades into the background.
there,
appears to be but faint and elementary, it is
It is a
but the pattern is vague and indecisive.
mere aggregation of effects. When we come to living
beings, the definiteness of pattern is recovered and
(Whitehead,
the organic again rises into prominence.”
1925, p. 161.)

3

.

or
This has an important corollary that any static
social
his
and
man
of
purely conservative view
institutions, becomes untenable.

no
Consci ousness and the "Lure" of
the Future

Evolutionary theory brings to

a

sharp focus the rela-

tion between "life” and "matter"
which has perplexed every
biologist who ever tried to reconcile
his knowledge of
living organisms with the "mechanistic
model" of the universe
derived from classical Newtonian Physics.
It is the basic
tenet of emergent evolutionists that
everything has a past
from which it moves and hence all things -matter,
life,

mind, consciousness, man and mankind

--

are immersed in a

ceaseless process of evolution and change in
along

a

a

continuum

time and organizational complexity dimension.

evolution is

a

Thus

progressive advance into novelty, complexity

of organization and actualization of enfolded possibilities,

with matter,

(geogenesis) life (biogenesis), mind (noogenesis

or genesis of consciousness) as distinct thresholds or

boundary conditions separating different ontological levels.
On the nexus between matter and life, Whitehead remarks:
"In the overall picture, there is one of life as a passage
i

from mere physical order to mental novelty to coordinated

inheritance of mental novelty" (Whitehead, 1929, p. 164).
It is evident that with the emergence of consciousness,
a

landmark in man's evolution, comes the possibility and

increased potential for man to guide his own evolution.

Awareness connotes reflection on the past, present and the
future.

All biological species have evolved but as

Dobzhansky (1958) puts it, "only man is the sole product
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of evolution who knows he
has evolved and has continued
to
evolve.” As Phenix states
(1964):

"Man is engaged
tinuin 2 adventure drawn on
5??
the new levels ot fulfillment
by the lure of future
possibilities
.

Q uest for 'worth w hile experiences.

'

Alfred North

Whitehead proposes that we can best
explain evolution of
living forms if we recognize a three-fold

urge in organisms

in which

the art of life is first to be alive,
secondly to
be alive
a satisfactory way and thirdly to
acquire
an increase in satisfaction (Whitehead,
1958, p. 8).

m

Man, as portrayed in the cosmology of Whitehead
and

Teilhard de Chardin, is an emergent creature and cannot
be

understood apart from his inner pressure of subjective aim
for progressive and creative advance into novelty.

Again

Whitehead brings to our attention that:
the life aim of survival is modified into human
aim at survival for diversified worthwhile
experience (Whitehead, 1938, p. 43).

The above statements of Whitehead can be regarded as propo-

sitions which affirm the ontologically ingrained purpose in

human evolution.

Theories of biological evolution

recognize "creative" natural selection (Simpson, 1947) as
the directive force in this urge to acquire an increase in

satisfaction and make

a

bold prognosis of man's future.

Evidence from evolutionary biology points out unmistakably
that since the emergence of consciousness is a relatively
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new phenomenon in phylogeny, man has
scarcely begun to exhaust the possibilities of creative ways of
increasing the

quality of life or pursuing ’’worthwhile experiences;"
he
is just in the very early stages of
appreciating

the "lure"

of future possibilities.
One of the unique properties of consciousness is

subjective awareness of knowing and knowing that we know.

Knowing that we know presupposes subjective awareness of
not knowing

--

the ability to know when we don’t know.

Since

the more we know the more control we can exercise over the

environment, gaining knowledge is the door to increasing
effectance.

But we can only consciously set about to learn

something if we know that there is something unknown that
we want or need to know.

unknowns, itself

chief servants

4
.

a

Hence the capacity to be aware of

product of evolution, becomes one of its
It enables us to relate to unknowns in

ways that yield knowledge which will assist us to secure
the conditions of survival and improve its quality.

One

of the most problematical unknowns is our own future.

How

we relate to that unknown concerns the central dynamic in

value formation.

The structuring of this unknown

--

the

future -- and the orientation toward possibilities of

'diversified worthwhile experiences' or anticipation of

4.

am greatly indebted to Professor Jordan for sharing
this during a discussion on July 30, 1974.
I
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actualizing potentialities, gives
rise to the formation of
ideals.
An ideal is the structuring of
the unknown; it is

non-actual reality effective in the
present as it influences our interaction with the environment

a

thereby re-

structuring the pattern of energy utilization
which means
restructuring values. Human goals and aims are
not only
motivated by individual needs but also by the ideals
which
one strives to actualize.
It is an incontrovertible face that man’s awareness

of the future possibilities or unactualized potentialities

makes man his own maker.
the most profound nature.

This has moral consequences of
As Whitehead puts it:

’’The

effect of the present upon future is the business of morals"
(1967, p.

269)

It is these ideals,

then, which act as the goad for

structuring and restructuring the pattern of energy utilization of man's already actualized potentialities as he

moves toward the future.

The role of ideals in under-

standing the art of man's becoming has been recognized by
all writers on self-actualization.

Commenting on mystical

experiences William James writes:
The appearance is that in this phenomenon something
ideal, which in one sense is part of ourselves and in
another sense is not ourselves, actually exerts an
influence, raises our centre of personal energy,
and produces regenerative effects unattainable in
other ways.
(1958, p. 394.)

While Humphries (1968) points out:
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s.S='£*£rK“ s-iare s-sHuman values and experiences cannot
be adequately understood without extending their frame
of reference from the
merely biological and biosocial to the
ideal or transcendent
dimension. A theory of value is inevitably
a

facet of any

theory of being and becoming because becoming
presupposes
some actuality in process, and process
presupposes potentiality.

By choosing ideals, man takes charge of
his own

destiny.

This conscious control is isomorphic with learning

competence; it enables man to arrange his own environment
and guide his own interaction for actualization of
some
ideal.

Mumford writes:

"Every transformation of man except that perhaps
which produced neolithic culture, has rested on a
new metaphysical and ideological base; or rather
upon deeper stirrings and intuition whose rationalized
expression takes the form of a new picture of the cosmos
and the nature of man" (Mumford, 1962 p. 171 ).
,

If education is to transfer and transform the cultural

heritage consciously, the role of ideals in actualizing
future possibilities and potentialities of man and mankind,
can hardly be exaggerated.

The new definition of culture

given by Sorokin becomes very relevant in the light of the

above consideration:

Culture may be defined as the human activities
formulating progressively understanding and
appreciating and actually creating, all that
which is possible to classify within the broad domains
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of knowledge r truth,
aesthetic activity or beauty
?
and^mora! achievement
or goodness (Cowell
1970
,

With such a comprehensive
view of evolution, with the
role of ideals and values in
it, and such a redefinition
of
culture, many branches of human
activity will assume new
directions.
Education as conceived by the ANISA
MODEL will
be the chief among them.

ANISA Theory of Value
The following propositions characterize
the founda-

tions for the ANISA value theory and
represent the general

orientation and guiding principles of any future
value
inquiry in the Model's development.

which are necessarily presented in

These propositions
a

very general form can

be further elucidated only within the context of
the

philosophical base of the ANISA MODEL (Jordan and Shepard,
1972) and the theories of development (Kalinowsky and

Jordan, 1973) and volition (Conway, 1973) derived from its

philosophy.
Man’s becoming involves the process of actualizing
his potentialities which is sustained by interaction with
the environment.

The actualized potentialities are

structured and these structures determine learning.

The

patterns of utilization of the energy available to the

becoming man are when they are relatively enduring, called
values
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Value formation is
the

•-

»«. „„„

f.™ a

du ,

„„

, result
lt of the

all its categories

nitive
tive, affective
ff

„

“
le

°<

"<

actualization of th.
Potentialiti,
vi
Psychomotor, perceptual,

cog-

volitional fused with
the infer
rmation
about the environment.
,

•

The fusion includes
volitional elements and
hence
values always have an
evaluative or decision
ma king comPonent.
This aspect has
implications for increasing
individuals effectance
thus emergence of
values is inextricably bound with the
process of becoming.
The pattern of energy
utilization and the ends
to
which the energy is used
define the self and
constitute
the structure of personal
identity.

Chief among the factors in
the dynamics of structuring
the pattern of energy
utilization are the subjective
aim,
purpose, ideals and the "lure"
from the environment.
In
the ultimate analysis these
factors become the primary
determinants in human behavior.
Values and the value systems of
the individual, the
society and the culture become
valid only to the extent
that the determinants that
structure the energy pattern
themselves are validated.
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The subjective aims or
the ideals that serve as
the
'lure' for the structuring
of the pattern of utilization
Of human energy obtain
their validation on the basis
of
whether or not they facilitate
homeorhesis both in ontogenesis and phylogenesis, to
put mankind into chreods
leading to greater levels of
collective organization and
human solidarity because this
guarantees and increases the
quality of survival.

epilogue
BUILDING A SCIENCE OF
EDUCATION:

PROSPECTS

It is my firm conviction
that the emergent concepts

arising from the cross fertilization
of all those studies
that have to do with our knowledge
of man and his becoming
should be the corner stones of
the future edifice of the
science of education.
"All systems of education and of
research," observes Rene Dubos, "have
been organized on an
analytic pattern. What science has been
successful at, by
remaining for 350 years faithful to the
Cartesian doctrine,
is

to take any kind of problem and
dissociate it into its

components.

This is what universities are organized
to do

both research and training" (Dubos, 1967,
p. 13).

No major

breakthrough in education can come about unless there

is

a

high degree of integration and application of the
vast body
of research from several disciplines that have
contributed
to our understanding of human growth and development.

ANISA is

a

mission-oriented institution that has been

precisely designed to provide the kind of integration sorely
needed for research and action, and has provided

a

blueprint

for a system of education for man to be able to actualize

his full range of potentialities.

The ANISA educational

model makes no pretention to completeness in its articulation of the basic constructs that go into building its

theory
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In an age of piecemeal
analysis ANISA's venture may
seem to be a hopelessly broad

undertaking.

Educators of
this era find themselves in the
same positions as the

scientific pioneers of the earlier
centuries.
No systematic body of knowledge for a scientific
foundation for
education can be built up from any one
discipline.
Without
such a foundation no superstructure can
be built.
It is

clear that the primary educational need of
our time is to
formulate, however tentatively, the underlying
principles,

assumptions, and theories upon which educational
research,
planning, and implementation can rest and with that as
the

basis seek to build up

a

systematic body of knowledge by

testing out hypothesis generated from the theories.

Educators may ignore or be apathetic to the problem
of systematizing educational theory building on

a

scientific

basis, but in the meantime, schools and other related in-

stitutions are making decisions without the benefit of
any basic philosophy or organized body of knowledge to guide

their decision making.

It may be argued that without such

collaborative research, the principles
man

-

his being and becoming

-

of the science of

may. not be understood.

But

with 6000 years of social history and all the wit and

wisdom of the scientists, philosophers, saints, and seers
at our disposal,

it would seem that at least a speculative

beginning on the science of man and his becoming should be
made.

Resorting to speculative leaps should not be
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labelled as

a

subjective treatment of the
inquiry.

The

biggest blind spot that thwarts
such attempts by educators
and behavioral scientists
is their inability to admit,
as
Bonner (1965, p. 32) puts it,
"that 'objective' knowledg,
[e
can be obtained by 'subjective'
means."

Educators, who are in the business of
building a
'science of education' must take lessons
from the philosophy,
development, and history of science; one of
the lessons
conveyed to us by developments in modern
physics is the key
role of speculation in science.
Indeed the great physicists
of the twentieth-century such as Einstein, Max
Planck and

Heisenberg, as affirmed in their biographies, arrived
at
their theories by means of speculative thinking.

Complete

empirical proof is neither possible nor necessary in
science, for "proof" says Eddington (1929), "is the idol

before whom the pure mathematician tortures himself."
It

is

possible, after testing out the relevant hypotheses,

that no discoverable principles exist in the science of man

and even if they exist there is no certainty that universal

agreement on them can be achieved.

But a similar uncer-

tainty holds true in all the other scientific endeavors as
well.

Newtonian physics was challenged by the theory of

relativity.

Those before Einstein regarded Newtonian

Physics as virtually

a

divine revelation of the nature of

reality; subsequently this belief had to be modified.

The

atom defined as the ultimate particle has finally come apart
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and startled the world.

As some one remarked,
"The path

of scientific discovery
is always strewn with
wrecks of
discarded hypothesis." And
yet, those false assumptions
served an essential purpose in
the progress of science.
Science is not an unchanging, static
set of propositions,
nor a permanent body of approved
facts.
Quite obviously it
changes and the changes are not merely
additions of knowledge
but also revisions of basic tenets and
rejections of previous assumptions, now demonstrated to be
inadequate.

Discovery of pseudo-bricks in the structure of
science
has not deterred the scientist from
contributing
to the

building of hypotheses, to move from failure to victory
in
his conscious attempt to control natural forces.

It would

seem logical to assume even though our present day
knowledge
of the true nature of man, his ultimate destiny, and the

ecological system that maintains his integrity individually
and collectively is limited, an attempt to speculate on

them is worth while.
In education there is an implied frame of reference in

certain guiding principles that are commonly used, but
these are rarely made explicit.

In ANISA’s view,

if they

are formulated clearly and used as a starting point it

would facilitate the much needed communication among the
members of the community involved in educational practice.
It would likewise make possible the building of a coherent
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body of knowledge that would
make education relevant to
and
more powerful in serving the
needs of everchanging societal
needs
An essential part of any scientific
inquiry, as Phenix
puts it,

is

the creation of conceptual
categories suitable

to the subject matter to be
investigated which then, of

course,

should be used to construct theories and
paradigms.
A theory, if it is to be scientific,
cannot remain aloof in
the world of logic and conceptual categories
but must have

implications for action.

A significant property of scien-

tific theories which is not so often remembered by
those who

discuss it, as observed by Waddington (1962, p.
12) is
that

its value is quite largely dependent on its power of

suggesting the next step in scientific advance.

In fact

at the growing edges of science the stimulating and suggestive

theory is often preferred to one which may be less open to

criticism but which seems to lead us nowhere in particular.'

APPENDIX

124

A Summary Statement on
the AN ISA* Model 1

The ANISA model represents

a

comprehensive educational

system functionally defined by
specifications which insure
its replicability, evaluation,
and refinement.
The specifications set forth educational
objectives pertaining to
the actualization of human potential
and explanations of
how to achieve them.
These objectives and explanations
are derived from a coherent body of theory
which has been
deductively generated from a philosophical base
and in-

ductively validated to whatever extent possible
by findings
from empirical research.
Tue philosophy underlying the model is organismic
in nature;

it defines man as a spiritual as well as a

material being; explains his reality in terms of the
process of his becoming (actualization of potentiality)
accounts for his qualities of transcendence and immanence,
and sets forth fundamental ontological principles which

explicate man's relationship to the universe.

The body of theory derived from the philosophy

includes

A Theory of Development which defines develop-

ment as the translation of potentiality into

actuality and equates that translation with
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creativity; establishes two broad
categories of
potentialities -- biological and
psychological;

identifies proper nutrition as the
essential
element in the development of biological
potentialities and learning as the key factor

in the

release of psychological potentialities;

establishes five categories of psychological

potentialities

--

psycho -motor

,

perceptual,

cognitive, affective, and volitional; establishes

interaction with the environment as the means by

which development is sustained; fixes three
basic categories of environment (physical, human
and the unknown) and establishes the Self as
the micro-cosmic reflection of the three environ-

ments and the most constant aspect of the environ-

ment it experiences; and, categorizes interactions
in terms of their power to facilitate development

and safeguard survival.

A Theory of Curriculum which fixes the overarching goal of education as the actualization of

human potentialities and their structuring into
identities around ideals which guarantee survival
and perpetually improve its quality; establishes
two categories of goals or objectives of the

formal educational system

--

content goals and
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process goals; specifies the
substance of the
former as the information culture
has accumulated
organized in terms of the classification
of

environments, including the symbol systems
used
to convey that information, and the
substance

of the latter as formation of internal
structures
on which learning competence depends

(i.e.,

content

goals may specify what to think about, while

process goals concentrate on how to think)
accounts for the emergence of personal identity
(character formation) in terms of value formation
and defines values as the relatively enduring

structurings of potentialities (process) as they
are actualized and integrated with information

(content) assimilated about the various environ-

ments; and, specifies three value sub-systems
(material, social, and religious/aesthetic) on

which three higher order competencies rest
(technological, moral and spiritual/philosophical)
and which combine to form the total values system
that constitutes the personality

--

the Self.

A Theory of Pedagogy which defines teaching as

arranging environments and guiding the child’s

interaction with them for the purpose of achieving the goals specified by the curriculum theory;
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outlines the diagnostic,
prescriptive, speculative, experimental, and
improvisat ional aspects
of arranging environments
and guiding interaction
so that instruction is
individualized and learning
particularized thereby guaranteeing equality
of

educational opportunity.
A Theory of Administration which identifies
two

basic functions of administration which must
remain in dynamic equilibrium

management

--

--

leadership and

and defines them in terms of service

consistent with purpose as specified by the philosophy; provides the rationale for differentiating the staff, maintaining morale, establishing

institutional priorities, assessing needs, identifying resources, determining feasibility, and

allocating resources to achieve objectives as

efficiently as possible; provides the means for
institutional self -renewal

;

and, accounts for

the necessity and nature of community and home

involvement.
A Theory of Evaluation which designates comparative analysis of children’s interactions with

particular environments and their developmental
consequences as the focal point of inquiry;
seeks to relate means to ends, distinguishing
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efficient from final causes; and
allies the purpose of evaluation with the
heuristic, explanatory
and predictive functions of research
and science.

Because the model rests on the universal
processes of
growth and development, it has cross-cultural
applicability
and addresses directly the problem of how to
achieve equal

educational opportunity.

1.

See Appendix in Raman,

P.

(ed.)
Nutrition, development
selected
readings^
New York:
?
g
MSS Information
Corp., 1974.
ai

d learnin

ANISA is both

a

S.

'

word and an acronym.

Greek and Latin roots which refer to
fragrance has made it attractive as

a
a

As a word,

it has

flowering tree whose
symbol.

It has been

adopted to represent "the tree of life” --an ancient symbol

connoting shelter, beauty and grace, and the perpetual
growth and fruition of organic life.

As an acronym, ANISA

stands for American National Institutes for Social Advancement, an incorporated not-for-profit organization under

whose auspices the efforts to formulate the model were

undertaken
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